

September 1, 1965

will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRESIDENT DIEM, OCTOBER 26, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: My countrymen and I are proud to convey our good wishes to you and to the citizens of Vietnam on the fifth anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Vietnam.

We have watched the courage and daring with which you and the Vietnamese people attained independence in a situation so perilous that many thought it hopeless. We have admired the rapidity with which chaos yielded to order and progress replaced despair.

During the years of your independence it has been refreshing for us to observe how clearly the Government and the citizens of Vietnam have faced the fact that the greatest danger to their independence was communism. You and your countrymen have used your strength well in accepting the double challenge of building your country and resisting Communist imperialism. In 5 short years since the founding of the Republic, the Vietnamese people have developed their country in almost every sector. I was particularly impressed by one example. I am informed that last year over 1,200,000 Vietnamese children were able to go to elementary school; three times as many as were enrolled 5 years earlier. This is certainly a heartening development for Vietnam's future. At the same time Vietnam's ability to defend itself from the Communists has grown immeasurably since its successful struggle to become an independent republic.

Vietnam's very success as well as its potential wealth and its strategic location have led the Communists of Hanoi, goaded by the bitterness of their failure to enslave all Vietnam, to use increasing violence in their attempts to destroy your country's freedom.

This grave threat, added to the strains and fatigues of the long struggle to achieve and strengthen independence, must be a burden that would cause moments of tension and concern in almost any human heart. Yet from long observation I sense how deeply the Vietnamese value their country's independence and strength and I know how well you used your boldness when you led your countrymen in winning it. I also know that your determination has been a vital factor in guarding that independence while steadily advancing the economic development of your country. I am confident that these same qualities of determination and boldness will meet the renewed threat as well as the needs and desires of your countrymen for further progress on all fronts.

Although the main responsibility for guarding that independence will always, as it has in the past, belong to the Vietnamese people and their government, I want to assure you that for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO PRESIDENT DIEM, DECEMBER 14, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your recent letter in which you described so cogently the dangerous condition caused by North Vietnam's efforts to take over your country. The situation in your embattled country is well known to me and to the American people. We have been deeply dis-

turbed by the assault on your country. Our indignation has mounted as the deliberate savagery of the Communist program of assassination, kidnaping, and wanton violence became clear.

Your letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown—that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva accords designed to insure peace in Vietnam and to which they bound themselves in 1954.

At that time, the United States, although not a party to the accords, declared that it "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." We continue to maintain that view.

In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction of the floods which you describe. I have already given the orders to get these programs underway.

The United States, like the Republic of Vietnam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek to persuade the Communists to give up their attempts of force and subversion. In any case, we are confident that the Vietnamese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have sought so hard and so long.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

TOWARD PEACE WITH HONOR

(Press conference statement by the President, the White House, July 28, 1965)

Not long ago I received a letter from a woman in the Midwest. She wrote:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my humble way I am writing to you about the crisis in Vietnam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam. My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just something I don't understand. Why?"

I have tried to answer that question a dozen times and more in practically every State in this Union. I discussed it fully in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in San Francisco in June. Let me again, now, discuss it here in the East Room of the White House.

Why must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope and golden with promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one. But it echoes clearly from the painful lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime, in two world wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety, and weakness does not bring peace.

The nature of the war

It is this lesson that has brought us to Vietnam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government. But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam and spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer

the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism.

The stakes in Vietnam

And there are great stakes in the balance. Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and grasping ambition of Asian communism. Our power, therefore, is a vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise, or in American protection. In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened. And an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace. We learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict.

Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years, have committed themselves and have promised to help defend the small and valiant nation.

Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Vietnam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We cannot now dishonor our word or abandon our commitment or leave those who believed in us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.

This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Vietnam.

Increased effort to halt aggression

What are our goals in that war-stained land?

First: We intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces, their attacks, and the number of incidents. I have asked the commanding general, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.

I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time, to 35,000 per month, and stepping up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.

After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful consideration. And I will give the country adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations.

We have also discussed with the Government of South Vietnam lately the steps that they will take to substantially increase their own effort—both on the battlefield and toward reform and progress in the villages. Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new program to be tested upon his return to that area.

I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to be available immediately to the Congress to review with the appropriate congressional committees our plan in these areas. I have asked them to be avail-

September 1, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

available to thousands who under circumstances other than parole entered or became refugees after entry into the United States.

The immigration bill which the House passed on August 25 will not provide for the adjustment of status of Cuban refugees.

There are over 250,000 Cuban refugees in this country. It is estimated that 60,000 to 70,000 of them are living in New York City. In the interests of humanity we cannot ignore this problem any longer. It is one which money alone will not solve.

I have prepared this bill so that the adjustment of status will be voluntary; no one will be penalized if he does not wish to change his situation. But this bill says to each refugee, "You have come here as a refugee; whether you consider this stay temporary or permanent is a decision for you to make; as a country, the United States is prepared to help you in every way possible, whatever your decision."

This bill is addressed to an economic and social problem, not a political problem.

The bill contains special provisions for children in order that families may be kept together in case a child in a family applying for permanent residence might be found excludable under certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that this bill will receive prompt action by the Congress. The Cuban refugees deserve the opportunity to participate as permanent residents in the free society to which they with hope have fled.

WHY VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. COHELAN] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, one of the most comprehensive and thoughtful statements of this country's policy and this country's hopes for Vietnam is set forth in a recent publication of the administration entitled "Why Vietnam."

This document includes letters from President Eisenhower and President Kennedy which document the nature of our commitment. More important, it contains concise statements by President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara which speak directly to the steps that have been taken to resist aggression, to our continuing efforts to achieve negotiations and a peaceful settlement, and to the "third face of the war"—the pressing requirement to deal with the deep and underlying problems confronting the people of Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I include this document and also a transcript of a CBS special news program broadcast last week called "Vietnam Perspective: Winning the Peace." I include them for they speak pointedly to so many of the questions that are asked by thoughtful and concerned Americans.

WHY VIETNAM?

FOREWORD

My FELLOW AMERICANS: Once again in man's age-old struggle for a better life and a world of peace, the wisdom, courage, and compassion of the American people are being put to the test. This is the meaning of the tragic conflict in Vietnam.

In meeting the present challenge, it is essential that our people seek understanding and that our leaders speak with candor.

I have therefore directed that this report to the American people be compiled and widely distributed. In its pages you will find statements on Vietnam by three leaders of your Government—by your President, your Secretary of State, and your Secretary of Defense.

These statements were prepared for different audiences, and they reflect the differing responsibilities of each speaker. The congressional testimony has been edited to avoid undue repetition and to incorporate the sense of the discussions that ensued.

Together, they construct a clear definition of America's role in the Vietnam conflict: the dangers and hopes that Vietnam holds for all free men, the fullness and limits of our national objectives in a war we did not seek, the constant effort on our part to bring this war we do not desire to a quick and honorable end.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

AUGUST 20, 1965.

THE ROOTS OF COMMITMENT

In the historic documents that follow, two American Presidents define and affirm the commitment of the United States to the people of South Vietnam.

In letters to Prime Minister Churchill in 1954 and to President Diem in 1954 and 1960. President Eisenhower describes the issues at stake and pledges United States assistance to South Vietnam's resistance to subversion and aggression.

And in December 1961 President Kennedy reaffirms that pledge.

EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, APRIL 4, 1954

(From Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change, 1953-56," New York, 1963)

DEAR WINSTON: I am sure * * * you are following with the deepest interest and anxiety the daily reports of the gallant fight being put up by the French at Dien Bien Phu. Today, the situation there does not seem hopeless.

But regardless of the outcome of this particular battle, I fear that the French cannot alone see the thing through, this despite the very substantial assistance in money and materiel that we are giving them. It is no solution simply to urge the French to intensify their efforts. And if they do not see it through and Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists the ultimate effect on our and your global strategic position with the consequent shift in the power ratios throughout Asia and the Pacific could be disastrous and, I know, unacceptable to you and me. * * * This has led us to the hard conclusion that the situation in southeast Asia requires us urgently to take serious and far-reaching decisions.

Geneva is less than 4 weeks away. There the possibility of the Communists driving a wedge between us will, given the state of mind in France, be infinitely greater than at Berlin. I can understand the very natural desire of the French to seek an end to this war which has been bleeding them for 8 years. But our painstaking search for a way out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us to the conclusion that there is no negotiated solution of the Indochina problem which in its essence would not be either a face-saving

device to cover a French surrender or a face-saving device to cover a Communist retirement. The first alternative is too serious in its broad strategic implications for us and for you to be acceptable. * * *

Somehow we must contrive to bring about the second alternative. The preliminary lines of our thinking were sketched out by Foster [Dulles] in his speech last Monday night when he said that under the conditions to today the imposition on southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communists ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community, and that in our view this possibility should now be met by united action and not passively accepted. * * *

I believe that the best way to put teeth in this concept and to bring greater moral and material resources to the support of the French effort is through the establishment of a new, ad hoc grouping or coalition composed of nations which have a vital concern in the checking of Communist expansion in the area. I have in mind, in addition to our two countries, France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines. The U.S. Government would expect to play its full part in such a coalition. * * *

The important thing is that the coalition must be strong and it must be willing to join the fight if necessary. I do not envisage the need of any appreciable ground forces on your or our part. * * *

If I may refer again to history; we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson? * * *

With warm regard,

IKE.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRESIDENT DIEM, OCTOBER 1, 1954

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Vietnam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Vietnam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your government can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial, provided that your government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts,

September 1, 1965

Had all these crossed the line at once—as the North Koreans did in invading South Korea 15 years ago—no body in the free world could have doubted that the assault on Vietnam was an aggression. That the dividing line between North and South Vietnam was intended to be temporary does not make the attack any less of an aggression. The dividing line in Korea also was intended to be temporary.

If there is ever to be peace in this world, aggression must cease. We as a nation are committed to peace and the rule of law. We recognize also the harsh reality that our security is involved.

We are committed to oppose aggression not only through the United Nations Charter but through many defensive alliances. We have 42 allies, not counting the Republic of Vietnam. And many other nations know that their security depends upon us. Our power and our readiness to use it to assist others to resist aggression, the integrity of our commitment, these are the bulwarks of peace in the world.

If we were to fall in Vietnam, serious consequences would ensue. Our adversaries would be encouraged to take greater risks elsewhere. At the same time, the confidence which our allies and other free nations now have in our commitments would be seriously impaired.

The commitment

Let us be clear about our commitment in Vietnam.

It began with the Southeast Asia Treaty, which was negotiated and signed after the Geneva agreements and the cease-fire in Indochina in 1954 and was approved by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 82 to 1 in February 1955. That treaty protects against Communist aggression not only its members but any of the three non-Communist states growing out of former French Indochina which asks for protection.

Late in 1954 President Eisenhower, with bipartisan support, decided to extend aid to South Vietnam, both economic aid and aid in training its armed forces. His purpose, as he said, was to "assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

Vietnam became a republic in 1955, was recognized as an independent nation by 36 nations initially, and is so recognized by more than 50 today.

Beginning in 1955, the Congress has each year approved overall economic and military assistance programs in which the continuation of major aid to South Vietnam has been specifically considered.

During the next 5 years, South Vietnam made remarkable economic and social progress—what some observers described as a "miracle."

Nearly a million refugees from the north were settled. These were the stouthearted people of whom the late Dr. Tom Dooley wrote so eloquently in his first book, "Deliver Us From Evil," and who led him to devote the rest of his all-too-brief life to helping the people of Vietnam and Laos.

A land-reform program was launched. A comprehensive system of agricultural credit was set up. Thousands of new schools and more than 3,500 village health stations were built. Rail transportation was restored and roads were repaired and improved. South Vietnam not only fed itself but resumed rice exports. Production of rubber and sugar rose sharply. New industries were started. Per capita income rose by 20 percent.

By contrast, North Vietnam suffered a drop of 10 percent in food production and disappointments in industrial production.

In 1954, Hanoi almost certainly had expected to take over South Vietnam within a few years. But by 1959 its hopes had withered and the south was far outstripping the

heralded "Communist paradise." These almost certainly were the factors which led Hanoi to organize and launch the assault on the south.

I beg leave to quote from a statement I made at a press conference on May 4, 1961:

"Since late in 1959 organized Communist activity in the form of guerrilla raids against army and security units of the Government of Vietnam, terrorist acts against local officials and civilians, and other subversive activities in the Republic of Vietnam have increased to levels unprecedented since the Geneva agreements of 1954. During this period the organized armed strength of the Vietcong, the Communist apparatus operating in the Republic of Vietnam, has grown from about 3,000 to over 12,000 personnel. This armed strength has been supplemented by an increase in the numbers of political and propaganda agents in the area.

"During 1960 alone, Communist armed units and terrorists assassinated or kidnaped over 3,000 local officials, military personnel, and civilians. Their activities took the form of armed attacks against isolated garrisons, attacks on newly established townships, ambushes on roads and canals, destruction of bridges, and well-planned sabotage against public works and communication lines. Because of Communist guerrilla activity 200 elementary schools had to be closed at various times, affecting over 25,000 students and 800 teachers.

"This upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity apparently stemmed from a decision made in May 1959 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of North Vietnam which called for the reunification of Vietnam by all 'appropriate means.' In July of the same year the Central Committee was reorganized and charged with intelligence duties and the liberation of South Vietnam. In retrospect this decision to step up guerrilla activity was made to reverse the remarkable success which the Government of the Republic of Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh Diem had achieved in consolidating its political position and in attaining significant economic recovery in the 5 years between 1954 and 1959.

"Remarkably coincidental with the renewed Communist activity in Laos, the Communist Party of North Vietnam at its Third Congress on September 10, 1960, adopted a resolution which declared that the Vietnamese resolution has as a major strategic task the liberation of the south from the rule of U.S. imperialists and their henchmen. This resolution called for the direct overthrow of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam."

Next door to South Vietnam, Laos was threatened by a similar Communist assault. The active agent of attack on both was Communist North Vietnam, with the backing of Peking and Moscow. In the case of Laos, we were able to negotiate an agreement in 1962 that it should be neutral and that all foreign military personnel should be withdrawn. We complied with that agreement. But North Vietnam never did. In gross violation of its pledge, it left armed units in Laos and continued to use Laos as a corridor to infiltrate arms and trained men into South Vietnam.

There was no new agreement, even on paper, on Vietnam. Late in 1961, President Kennedy therefore increased our assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. During that year, the infiltration of arms and military personnel from the north continued to increase. To cope with that escalation, President Kennedy decided to send more American military personnel—to assist with logistics and transportation and communications as well as with training and as advisers to South Vietnamese forces in the field. Likewise, we expanded our economic assistance and technical advice, particularly with a view to improving living conditions in the villages.

During 1962 and 1963, Hanoi continued to increase its assistance to the Vietcong. In response, President Kennedy and later President Johnson increased our aid.

Hanoi kept on escalating the war throughout 1964. And the Vietcong intensified its drafting and training of men in the areas it controls.

Last August, you will recall, North Vietnamese forces attacked American destroyers in international waters. That attack was met by appropriate air response against North Vietnamese naval installations. And Congress, by a combined vote of 504 to 2, passed a resolution expressing its support for actions by the Executive "including the use of armed force" to meet aggression in southeast Asia, including specifically aggression against South Vietnam. The resolution and the congressional debate specifically envisaged that, subject to continuing congressional consultation, the Armed Forces of the United States might be committed in the defense of South Vietnam in any way that seemed necessary, including employment in combat.

In summary, our commitment in Vietnam has been set forth in the Southeast Asia Treaty, which was almost unanimously approved by the U.S. Senate; the pledges made with bipartisan support by three successive Presidents of the United States; the assistance programs approved annually, beginning in 1955, by bipartisan majorities in both Houses of Congress; the declarations which we joined our SEATO and ANZUS allies in making at their Ministerial Council Meetings in 1964 and 1965; the joint congressional resolution of August 1964, which was approved by a combined vote of 504 to 2.

Our commitment is to assist the Government and people of South Vietnam to repel this aggression, thus preserving their freedom. This commitment is to the South Vietnamese as a nation and people. It has continued through various changes of government, just as our commitments to our NATO allies remain unaltered by changes in government.

Continued escalation of the aggression by the other side has required continued strengthening of the military defenses of South Vietnam. Whether still more American military personnel will be needed will depend on events, especially on whether the other side continues to escalate the aggression. As the President has made plain, we will provide the South Vietnamese with whatever assistance may be necessary to ensure that the aggression against them is effectively repelled—that is, to make good on our commitment.

The pursuit of a peaceful settlement

As President Johnson and his predecessors have repeatedly emphasized, our objective in southeast Asia is peace—a peace in which the various peoples of the area can manage their own affairs in their own ways and address themselves to economic and social progress.

We seek no bases or special position for the United States. We do not seek to destroy or overturn the Communist regimes in Hanoi and Peking. We ask only that they cease their aggressions, that they leave their neighbors alone.

Repeatedly, we and others have sought to achieve a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam.

We have had many talks with the Soviet authorities over a period of more than 4 years. But their influence in Hanoi appears to be limited. Recently, when approached, their response has been, in substance: You have come to the wrong address—nobody has authorized us to negotiate. Talk to Hanoi.

We have had a long series of talks with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw. Although Peking is more cautious in action than in word, it is unbending in its hostility to us

September 1, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

21701

able to answer the questions of any Member of Congress.

Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited amount to present legislation to help meet part of his new cost until a supplemental measure is ready and hearings can be held when the Congress assembles in January.

In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the present Defense appropriations bill now to transfer funds, in addition to the additional money that we will request.

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement. We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can foresee. Nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power.

But we will not surrender. And we will not retreat.

For behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources of all of the American Nation.

Toward a peaceful solution

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable. We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly, and many times, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time. Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions, with the help of 40 nations throughout the world. But there has been no answer.

But we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost.

I have spoken many times of our objectives in Vietnam. So has the Government of South Vietnam. Hanoi has set forth its own proposal. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose people may be affected. For we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield.

The United Nations

In this pursuit we welcome, and we ask for, the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials—or any one of its 114 members—can, by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and the gratitude of the United States of America.

I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Secretary-General U Thant a letter from me requesting that all of the resources, energy, and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam. I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago.

Free choice for Vietnam

We do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory. But we insist, and we will always insist, that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the south, or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision. And they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

This was the purpose of the 1954 agreements which the Communists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those agreements was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action.

As battle rages, we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich the condition of their life—to feed the hungry, to tend the sick—teach the young, shelter the homeless, and help the farmer to increase his crops, and the worker to find a job.

Progress in human welfare

It is an ancient, but still terrible, irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man are united in the simple elusive desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding toil.

As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we can help all the people of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black has made great progress since my appearance in Baltimore in that direction, not as the price of peace—for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost—but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man.

The difficulty of decision

Let me also add a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, in a hundred towns, in every State in this Union—working and laughing, building, and filled with hope and life. I think that I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President.

A nation which builds

There is something else, too. When I was young, poverty was so common that we didn't know it had a name. Education was something you had to fight for. And water was life itself. I have now been in public life 35 years, more than three decades, and in each of those 35 years I have seen good men, and wise leaders, struggle to bring the blessings of this land to all of our people. Now I am the President. It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every American citizen have an equal opportunity, to help every family get a decent home and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old.

As I have said before, that is what I have lived for. That is what I have wanted all my life. And I do not want to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many people for so many years now drowned in the wasteful ravages of war. I am going to do all I can to see that that never happens.

But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy we must have the courage to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom—all swept away on the flood of conquest.

So this too shall not happen; we will stand in Vietnam.

THE TASKS OF DIPLOMACY

(Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, August 3, 1965)

As the President has said, "there are great stakes in the balance" in Vietnam today.

Let us be clear about those stakes. With its archipelagos, southeast Asia contains rich natural resources and some 200 million people. Geographically, it has great strategic importance—it dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side, and Australia and New Zealand on the other.

The loss of southeast Asia to the Communists would constitute a serious shift in the

balance of power against the interests of the free world. And the loss of South Vietnam would make the defense of the rest of southeast Asia much more costly and difficult. That is why the SEATO Council has said that the defeat of the aggression against South Vietnam is "essential" to the security of southeast Asia.

But much more is at stake than preserving the independence of the peoples of southeast Asia and preventing the vast resources of that area from being swallowed by those hostile to freedom.

The test

The war in Vietnam is a test of a technique of aggression; what the Communists, in their upside-down language, call wars of national liberation. They use the term to describe any effort by Communists short of large-scale war, to destroy by force any non-Communist government. Thus the leaders of the Communist terrorists in such an independent democracy as Venezuela are described as leaders of a fight for "national liberation." And a recent editorial in Pravda said that "the upsurge of the national liberation movement in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of the activities of Communist Parties."

Communist leaders know, as the rest of the world knows, that thermonuclear war would be ruinous. They know that large-scale invasions, such as that launched in Korea 15 years ago, would bring great risks and heavy penalties. So, they have resorted to semi-concealed aggression through the infiltration of arms and trained military personnel across national frontiers. And the Asian Communists themselves regard the war in Vietnam as a critical test of that technique. Recently General Giap, leader of North Vietnam's army, said:

"If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world."

In southeast Asia, the Communists already have publicly designated Thailand as the next target. And if the aggression against South Vietnam were permitted to succeed, the forces of militant communism everywhere would be vastly heartened and we could expect to see a series of so-called wars of liberation in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

International law does not restrict internal revolution. But it does restrict what third powers may lawfully do in sending arms and men to bring about insurrection. What North Vietnam is doing in South Vietnam flouts not only the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 but general international law.

The assault on the Republic of Vietnam is, beyond question, an aggression. It was organized and has been directed by North Vietnam, with the backing of Communist China. The cadres of guerrilla fighters, saboteurs, and assassins who form the backbone of the Vietcong were specially trained in the North. Initially, many of them were men of South Vietnamese birth who had fought with the Viet Minh against the French and gone North in their military units after Vietnam was divided in 1954. But that reservoir was gradually exhausted. During 1964 and since, most of the military men infiltrated from the North have been natives of North Vietnam. And near the end of last year they began to include complete units of the regular North Vietnamese army. In addition to trained men and political and military direction, the North has supplied arms and ammunition in increasing quantities—in considerable part of Chinese manufacture.

Between 1959 and the end of 1964, 40,000 trained military personnel came down from the North into South Vietnam, by conservative estimate. More have come this year.

and plainly opposed to any negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

There have been repeated contacts with Hanoi. Many channels are open. And many have volunteered to use them. But so far there has been no indication that Hanoi is seriously interested in peace on any terms except those which would assure a Communist takeover of South Vietnam.

We and others have sought to open the way for conferences on the neighboring states of Laos and Cambodia, where progress toward peace might be reflected in Vietnam. These approaches have been blocked by Hanoi and Peiping.

The United Kingdom, as cochairman of the Geneva conferences, has repeatedly sought a path to a settlement—first by working toward a new Geneva Conference, then by a visit by a senior British statesman. Both efforts were blocked by the Communists—and neither Hanoi nor Peiping would even receive the senior British statesman.

In April, President Johnson offered unconditional discussions with the governments concerned. Hanoi and Peiping called this offer a "hoax."

Seventeen nonaligned nations appealed for a peaceful solution, by negotiations without preconditions. We accepted the proposal. Hanoi and Red China rejected it with scorn calling some of its authors "monsters and freaks."

The President of India made a constructive proposal for an end to hostilities and an Afro-Asian patrol force. We welcomed this proposal with interest and hope. Hanoi and Peiping rejected it as a betrayal.

In May, the United States and South Vietnam suspended air attacks on North Vietnam. This action was made known to the other side to see if there would be a response in kind. But Hanoi denounced the pause as "a wornout trick" and Peiping denounced it as a "swindle." Some say the pause was not long enough. But we knew the negative reaction from the other side before we resumed. And we had paused previously for more than 4 years while thousands of armed men invaded the south and killed thousands of South Vietnamese, including women and children, and deliberately destroyed school-houses and playgrounds and hospitals and health centers and other facilities that the South Vietnamese had built to improve their lives and give their children a chance for a better education and better health.

In late June, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers established a mission of four of their members to explore with all parties concerned the possibilities for a conference leading to a just and lasting peace. Hanoi and Peiping made it plain that they would not receive the mission.

Mr. Harold Davies, a member of the British Parliament, went to Hanoi with the approval of Prime Minister Wilson. But the high officials there would not even talk with him. And the lower-ranking officials who did talk with him made it clear that Hanoi was not yet interested in negotiations, that it was intent on a total victory in South Vietnam. As Prime Minister Wilson reported to the House of Commons, Mr. Davies met with a conviction among the North Vietnamese that their prospects of victory were too imminent for them to forsake the battlefield for the conference table.

We and others have made repeated efforts at discussions through the United Nations. In the Security Council, after the August attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, we supported a Soviet proposal that the Government of North Vietnam be invited to come to the Security Council. But Hanoi refused.

In April, Secretary General U Thant considered visits to Hanoi and Peiping to explore the possibilities of peace. But both those Communists regimes made it plain that they did not regard the United Nations as competent to deal with that matter.

The President's San Francisco speech in June requested help from the United Nations' membership at large in getting peace talks started.

In late July the President sent our new Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, to New York with a letter to Secretary General U Thant requesting that all the resources, energy and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam. The Secretary General has already accepted this assignment.

We sent a letter to the Security Council calling attention to the special responsibility in this regard of the Security Council and of the nations which happen to be members of the Council. We have considered from time to time placing the matter formally before the Security Council. But we have been advised by many nations—and by many individuals—who are trying to help to achieve a peaceful settlement that to force debate and a vote in the Security Council might tend to harden positions and make useful explorations and discussions even more difficult.

President Johnson has publicly invited any and all members of the United Nations to do all they can to bring about a peaceful settlement.

By these moves the United States has intended to engage the serious attention and efforts of the United Nations as an institution, and its members as signatories of its charter, in getting the Communists to talk rather than fight—while continuing with determination an increasing effort to demonstrate that Hanoi and the Vietcong cannot settle the issue on the battlefield.

We have not only placed the Vietnam issue before the United Nations, but believe that we have done so in the most constructive ways.

The conditions for peace

What are the essential conditions for peace in South Vietnam?

In late June, the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam set forth the fundamental principles of a "just and enduring peace." In summary, those principles are:

An end to aggression and subversion.

Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny "in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources."

As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the Government of South Vietnam and the nations that have come to its aid to defend South Vietnam; and the removal of foreign military forces from South Vietnam.

And effective guarantees for the freedom of the people of South Vietnam.

We endorse those principles. In essence, they would constitute a return to the basic purpose of the Geneva accords of 1954. Whether they require reaffirmation of those accords or new agreements embodying these essential points, but with provision in either case for more effective international machinery and guarantees, could be determined in discussions and negotiations.

Once the basic points set forth by South Vietnam's Foreign Minister were achieved, future relations between North Vietnam and South Vietnam could be worked out by peaceful means. And this would include the question of a free decision by the people of North and South Vietnam on the matter of reunification.

When the aggression has ceased and the freedom of South Vietnam is assured by other means, we will withdraw our forces. Three Presidents of the United States have said many times that we want no permanent bases and no special position there. Our military forces are there because of the North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam and for no other reason. When the men and

arms infiltrated by the North are withdrawn and Hanoi ceases its support and guidance of the war in the South, whatever remains in the form of indigenous dissent is a matter for the South Vietnamese themselves. As for South Vietnamese fighting in the Vietcong or under its control or influence, they must in time be integrated into their national society. But that is a process which must be brought about by the people of South Vietnam, not by foreign diplomats.

Apart from the search for a solution in Vietnam itself, the U.S. Government has hoped that discussions could be held on the problems concerning Cambodia and Laos. We supported the proposal of Prince Sihanouk for a conference on Cambodia, to be attended by the governments that participated in the 1954 conference, and noted the joint statement of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in April, to the effect that both favored the convening of conferences on Cambodia and Laos. Subsequently, however, Hanoi appeared to draw back and to impose conditions at variance with the Cambodian proposal.

We look beyond a just and enduring peace for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, to the day when Peiping will be ready to join in a general settlement in the Far East—a general settlement that would remove the threat of aggression and make it possible for all the peoples of the area to devote themselves to economic and social progress.

Several of the nations of Asia are densely populated. And high rates of population growth make it difficult for them to increase per capita incomes. The solution to these problems cannot be found through external aggression. They must be achieved internally within each nation.

As President Johnson has said, the United States stands ready to assist and support cooperative programs for economic development in Asia. Already we are making available additional funds for the development of the Mekong Valley. And we are taking the lead in organizing an Asian Development Bank, which we hope will be supported by all the major industrialized nations, including the Soviet Union. We would welcome membership by North Vietnam, when it has ceased its aggression.

Those are our objectives—peace and a better life for all who are willing to live at peace with their neighbors.

The present path

I turn now to the specific actions we are taking to convince Hanoi that it will not succeed and that it must move toward a peaceful solution.

Secretary McNamara is appearing before the appropriate committees of the Congress to discuss the military situation within South Vietnam in detail. In essence, our present view is that it is crucial to turn the tide in the south, and that for this purpose it is necessary to send substantial numbers of additional American forces.

The primary responsibility for defeating the Vietcong will remain, however, with the South Vietnamese. They have some 545,000 men in military and paramilitary forces. Despite losses, every branch of the armed forces of South Vietnam has more men under arms than it had 6 months ago. And they are making systematic efforts to increase their forces still further. The primary missions of American ground forces are to secure the airbases used by the South Vietnamese and ourselves and to provide a strategic reserve, thus releasing South Vietnamese troops for offensive actions against the Vietcong. In securing the airbases and related military installations, American forces are pushing out into the countryside to prevent build-ups for surprise attacks. And they may be used in emergencies to help the South Vietnamese in combat. But the main task of rooting out the Vietcong will continue to be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese.

September 1, 1965

And we have seen no sign that they are about to try to shift that responsibility to us. On the contrary, the presence of increasing numbers of American combat troops seems to have stimulated greater efforts on the part of the fighting men of South Vietnam.

At the same time, on the military side, we shall maintain, with the South Vietnamese, our program of limited air attacks on military targets in North Vietnam. This program is a part of the total strategy. We had never expected that air attacks on North Vietnam alone would bring Hanoi to a quick decision to cease its aggression. Hanoi has been committed to its aggression too long and too deeply to turn around overnight. It must be convinced that it faces not only continuing, and perhaps increased, pressure on the north itself, but also that it simply cannot win in the south.

The air attacks on the North have also had specific military effects in reducing the scale of increased infiltration from the North. Finally, they are important as a warning to all concerned that there are no longer sanctuaries for aggression.

It has been suggested in some quarters that Hanoi would be more disposed to move to negotiations and to cease its aggression if we stopped bombing the North. We do not rule out the possibility of another and longer pause in bombing, but the question remains—and we have repeatedly asked it: What would happen from the North in response? Would Hanoi withdraw the 325th Division of the Regular Army, which is now deployed in South Vietnam and across the line in Laos? Would it take home the other men it has infiltrated into the South? Would it stop sending arms and ammunition into South Vietnam? Would the campaign of assassination and sabotage in the South cease? We have been trying to find out what would happen if we were to suspend our bombing of the North. We have not been able to get an answer or even a hint.

Those who complain about air attacks on military targets in North Vietnam would carry more weight if they had manifested, or would manifest now, appropriate concern about the infiltrations from the North, the high rate of military activity in the South, and the ruthless campaign of terror and assassination which is being conducted in the South under the direction of Hanoi and with its active support.

The situation in South Vietnam

Let me now underline just a few points about the political and economic situation in South Vietnam. For we know well that, while security is fundamental to turning the tide, it remains vital to do all we can on the political and economic fronts.

All of us have been concerned, of course, by the difficulties of the South Vietnamese in developing an effective and stable government. But this failure should not astonish us. South Vietnam is a highly plural society striving to find its political feet under very adverse conditions. Other nations—new and old—with fewer difficulties and unmolested by determined aggressors have done no better. South Vietnam emerged from the French Indochina war with many political factions, most of which were firmly anti-Communist. Despite several significant initial successes in establishing a degree of political harmony, the government of President Diem could not maintain a lasting unity among the many factions. The recent shifting and reshuffling of Vietnamese Governments is largely the continuing search for political unity and a viable regime which can overcome these long-evident political divisions.

And we should not forget that the destruction of the fabric of government at all levels has been a primary objective of the Vietcong.

The Vietcong has assassinated thousands of local officials—and health workers and schoolteachers and others who were helping to improve the life of the people of the countryside. In the last year and a half, it has killed, wounded, or kidnapped 2,291 village officials and 22,146 other civilians—these on top of its thousands of earlier victims.

Despite the risks to themselves and their families, Vietnamese have continued to come forward to fill these posts. And in the last 6 years, no political dissenter of any consequence has gone over to the Vietcong. The Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects, the Cambodians (of which there are about a million in South Vietnam), the Montagnards—all the principal elements in South Vietnamese political life except the Vietcong itself, which is a very small minority—remain overwhelmingly anti-Communist.

The suggestion that Ho Chi Minh probably could win a free election in South Vietnam is directly contrary to all the evidence we have. And we have a great deal of evidence, for we have Americans—in twos and threes and fours and sixes—in the countryside in all parts of Vietnam. In years past Ho Chi Minh was a hero throughout Vietnam. For he had led the fight against the Japanese and then against the French. But his glamour began to fade when he set up a Communist police state in the North—and the South, by contrast, made great progress under a non-Communist nationalist government. Today the North Vietnamese regime is badly discredited. We find the South Vietnamese in the countryside ready to cooperate with their own government when they can do so with reasonable hope of not being assassinated by the Vietcong the next night.

At the present time, somewhat more than 50 percent of the people of Vietnam live in areas under control of their government. Another 25 percent live in areas under shifting control. And about 25 percent live in areas under varying degrees of Vietcong control. But even where it succeeds in imposing taxes, drafting recruits, and commandeering labor, the Vietcong has not usually been able to organize the area. We have a good deal of evidence that Vietcong tax exactions and terrorism have increasingly alienated the villagers. And one of the problems with which the South Vietnamese Government and we have to deal is the large scale exodus from the Central Highlands to the coastal areas of refugees from the Vietcong.

It is of the greatest significance that, despite many years of harsh war, despite the political instability of the central government, and despite division of their country since 1954, the people of South Vietnam fight on with uncommon determination. There is no evidence among politicians, the bureaucracy, the military, the major religious groups, the youth, or even the peasantry of a desire for peace at any price. They all oppose surrender or accommodation on a basis which would lead to a Communist takeover. The will to resist the aggression from the North has survived through periods of great stress and remains strong.

The central objective of our foreign policy is a peaceful community of nations, each free to choose its own institutions but cooperating with one another to promote their mutual welfare. It is the kind of world order envisaged in the opening sections of the United Nations Charter. But there have been and still are important forces in the world which seek a different goal—which deny the right of free choice, which seek to expand their influence and empires by every means including force.

The bulwark of peace

In defense of peace and freedom and the right of free choice:

We and others insisted that the Soviets withdraw their forces from Iran.

We went to the aid of Turkey and Greece. We joined in organizing the European recovery program and in forming the North Atlantic Alliance.

We and our allies have defended the freedom of West Berlin.

We and 15 other nations joined in repelling the aggression in Korea.

We have joined defensive alliances with many other nations and have helped them to strengthen their defensive military forces.

We supported the United Nations in its efforts to preserve the independence of the Congo.

We insisted that the Soviet Union withdraw strategic weapons from Cuba.

Had we not done these things—and others—the enemies of freedom, would now control much of the world and be in a position to destroy us or at least to sap our strength by economic strangulation.

For the same basic reasons that we took all those other measures to deter or to repel aggression, we are determined to assist the people of South Vietnam to defeat this aggression.

In his last public utterance, recorded only half an hour before his death, a great and beloved American, Adlai Stevenson said:

"There has been a great deal of pressure on me in the United States from many sources to take a position—a public position—inconsistent with that of my Government. Actually, I don't agree with those protestants. My hope in Vietnam is that resistance there may establish the fact that changes in Asia are not to be precipitated by outside forces."

I believe, with the President, that "once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable."

The great bulwark of peace for all free men—and therefore of peace for the millions ruled by the adversaries of freedom—has been, and is today, the power of the United States and our readiness to use that power, in cooperation with other free nations to deter or to defeat aggression, and to help other free nations to go forward economically, socially, and politically.

We have had to cope with a long series of dangerous crises caused by the aggressive appetites of others. But we are a great nation and people. I am confident that we will meet this test, as we have met others.

THE TASKS OF DEFENSE

(Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, August 4, 1965)

The issue in Vietnam is essentially the same as it was in 1954 when President Eisenhower said:

"I think it is no longer necessary to enter into a long argument or exposition to show the importance to the United States of Indochina and of the struggle going on there. No matter how the struggle may have started, it has long since become one of the testing places between a free form of government and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to have the greatest significance for us, and possibly for a long time into the future."

"We have here a sort of cork in the bottle, the bottle being the great area that includes Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, all of the surrounding areas of Asia with its hundreds of millions of people. * * *"

The nature of the conflict

What is at stake in Vietnam today is the ability of the free world to block Communist armed aggression and prevent the loss of all of southeast Asia, a loss which in its ultimate consequences could drastically alter the strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific to the grave detriment of our own security and that of our allies. While 15 years ago, in Korea, Communist aggres-

sion took the form of an overt armed attack, today in South Vietnam, it has taken the form of a large-scale intensive guerrilla operation.

The covert nature of this aggression, which characterized the earlier years of the struggle in South Vietnam, has now all but been stripped away. The control of the Vietcong effort by the regime in Hanoi, supported and incited by Communist China, has become increasingly apparent.

The struggle there has enormous implications for the security of the United States and the free world, and for that matter, the Soviet Union as well. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists have chosen to make South Vietnam the test case for their particular version of the so-called wars of national liberation. The extent to which violence should be used in overthrowing non-Communist governments has been one of the most bitterly contested issues between the Chinese and the Soviet Communists.

Although the former Chairman, Mr. Khrushchev, fully endorsed wars of national liberation as the preferred means of extending the sway of communism, he cautioned that "this does not necessarily mean that the transition to socialism will everywhere and in all cases be linked with armed uprising and civil war. * * * Revolution by peaceful means accords with the interests of the working class and the masses."

The Chinese Communists, however, insist that:

"Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought about through proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country. * * * The vanguard of the proletariat will remain unconquerable in all circumstances only if it masters all forms of struggle—peaceful and armed, open and secret, legal and illegal, parliamentary struggle and mass struggle, and so forth." (Letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963.)

Their preference for violence was even more emphatically expressed in an article in the Peking People's Daily of March 31, 1964:

"It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition, but it would be inappropriate to emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition. * * * the proletarian party must never substitute parliamentary struggle for proletarian revolution or entertain the illusion that the transition to socialism can be achieved through the parliamentary road. Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to socialism, the proletariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old state machine and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. * * *"

"Political power," the article quotes Mao Tse-tung as saying, "grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Throughout the world we see the fruits of these policies and in Vietnam, particularly, we see the effects of the Chinese Communists' more militant stance and their hatred of the free world. They make no secret of the fact that Vietnam is the test case, and neither does the regime in Hanoi. General Giap, head of the North Vietnamese Army, recently said that "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. * * * If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world." And, Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, pointed out that "The experience of our compatriots in South Vietnam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of South America."

It is clear that a Communist success in South Vietnam would be taken as proof that

the Chinese Communists' position is correct and they will have made a giant step forward in their efforts to seize control of the world Communist movement.

Furthermore, such a success would greatly increase the prestige of Communist China among the nonaligned nations and strengthen the position of their followers everywhere. In that event we would then have to be prepared to cope with the same kind of aggression in other parts of the world whenever the existing governments are weak and the social structures fragmented. If Communist armed aggression is not stopped in Vietnam, as it was in Korea, the confidence of small nations in America's pledges of support will be weakened and many of them, in widely separated areas of the world, will feel unsafe.

Thus, the stakes in South Vietnam are far greater than the loss of one small country to communism. Its loss would be a most serious setback to the cause of freedom and would greatly complicate the task of preventing the further spread of militant Asian communism. And, if that spread is not halted, our strategic position in the world will be weakened and our national security directly endangered.

Conditions leading to the present situation in South Vietnam

Essential to a proper understanding of the present situation in South Vietnam is a recognition of the fact that the so-called insurgency there is planned, directed, controlled, and supported from Hanoi.

True, there is a small dissident minority in South Vietnam, but the government could cope with it if it were not directed and supplied from the outside. As early as 1960, at the Third Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, both Ho Chi Minh and General Giap spoke of the need to "step up" the "revolution in the South." In March 1963 the party organ Hoc Tap stated that the authorities in South Vietnam "are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution."

Through most of the past decade the North Vietnamese Government denied and went to great efforts to conceal the scale of its personnel and materiel support, in addition to direction and encouragement, to the Vietcong.

It had strong reasons to do so. The North Vietnamese regime had no wish to force upon the attention of the world its massive and persistent violations of its Geneva pledges of 1954 and 1962 regarding noninterference in South Vietnam and Laos.

However, in building up the Vietcong forces for a decisive challenge, the authorities in North Vietnam have increasingly dropped the disguises that gave their earlier support a clandestine character.

Through 1963, the bulk of the arms infiltrated from the North were old French and American models acquired prior to 1954 in Indochina and Korea.

Now, the flow of weapons from North Vietnam consist almost entirely of the latest arms acquired from Communist China; and the flow is large enough to have entirely re-equipped the main force units, despite the capture this year by government forces of thousands of these weapons and millions of rounds of the new ammunition.

Likewise, through 1963, nearly all the personnel infiltrating through Laos, trained and equipped in the North and ordered South, were former southerners.

But in the last 18 months, the great majority of the infiltrators—more than 10,000 of them—have been ethnic northerners, mostly draftees ordered into the People's Army of Vietnam for duty in the South. And it now appears that, starting their jour-

ney through Laos last December, from one to three regiments of a North Vietnamese regular division, the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army, have deployed into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam for combat alongside the Vietcong.

Thus, despite all its reasons for secrecy, Hanoi's desire for decisive results this summer has forced it to reveal its hand even more openly.

The United States during the last 4 years has steadily increased its help to the people of South Vietnam in an effort to counter this ever-increasing scale of Communist aggression. These efforts achieved some measure of success during 1962. The South Vietnamese forces in that year made good progress in suppressing the Vietcong insurrection.

Although combat deaths suffered by these forces in 1962 rose by 11 percent over the 1961 level (from about 4,000 to 4,450), Vietcong combat deaths increased by 72 percent (from about 12,000 to 21,000). Weapons lost by the South Vietnamese fell from 5,900 in 1961 to 5,200 in 1962, while the number lost by the Vietcong rose from 2,750 to 4,050. The Government's new strategic hamlet program was just getting underway and was showing promise. The economy was growing and the Government seemed firmly in control. Therefore, in early 1963, I was able to say: " * * * victory over the Vietcong will most likely take many years. But now, as a result of the operations of the last year, there is a new feeling of confidence, not only on the part of the Government of South Vietnam but also among the populace, that victory is possible."

But at the same time I also cautioned:

"We are not unmindful of the fact that the pressure on South Vietnam may well continue through infiltration via the Laos corridor. Nor are we unmindful of the possibility that the Communists, sensing defeat in their covert efforts, might resort to overt aggression from North Vietnam. Obviously, this latter contingency could require a greater direct participation by the United States. The survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of all southeast Asia and to the free world that we must be prepared to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory."

Unfortunately, the caution voiced in early 1963 proved to be well founded. Late in 1963, the Communists stepped up their efforts, and the military situation began to deteriorate. The Diem government came under increasing internal pressures, and in November it was overthrown. As I reported in February 1964:

"The Vietcong was quick to take advantage of the growing opposition to the Diem government and the period of uncertainty following its overthrow. Vietcong activities were already increasing in September and continued to increase at an accelerated rate in October and November, particularly in the delta area. And I must report that they have made considerable progress since the coup."

Following the coup, the lack of stability in the central government and the rapid turnover of key personnel, particularly senior military commanders, began to be reflected in combat operations and throughout the entire fabric of the political and economic structure. And, in 1964, the Communists greatly increased the scope and tempo of their subversive efforts. Larger scale attacks became more frequent and the flow of men and supplies from the north expanded. The incidence of terrorism and sabotage rose rapidly and the pressure on the civilian population was intensified.

The deteriorating military situation was clearly reflected in the statistics. South Vietnamese combat deaths rose from 5,650 in 1963 to 7,450 in 1964 and the number of

September 1, 1965

weapons lost from 8,250, to 14,100. In contrast, Vietcong combat deaths dropped from 20,800 to 16,800 and, considering the stepped-up tempo of activity, they experienced only a very modest rise in the rate of weapons lost (from 5,400 to 5,900).

At various times in recent months, I have called attention to the continued buildup of Communist forces in South Vietnam. I pointed out that although these forces had not been committed to combat in any significant degree, they probably would be after the start of the monsoon season. It is now clear that these forces are being committed in increasing numbers and that the Communists have decided to make an all-out attempt to bring down the Government of South Vietnam.

The entire economic and social structure is under attack. Bridges, railroads, and highways are being destroyed and interdicted. Agricultural products are being barred from the cities. Electric powerplants and communication lines are being sabotaged. Whole villages are being burned and their population driven away, increasing the refugees burden on the South Vietnamese Government.

In addition to the continued infiltration of increasing numbers of individuals and the acceleration of the flow of modern equipment and supplies organized units of the North Vietnamese Army have been identified in South Vietnam. We now estimate the hard core Vietcong strength at some 70,000 men, including a recently reported increase in the number of combat battalions. In addition, they have some 90,000 to 100,000 irregulars and some 30,000 in their political cadres; i.e., tax collectors, propagandists, etc. We have also identified at least three battalions of the regular North Vietnamese Army, and there are probably considerably more.

At the same time the Government of South Vietnam has found it increasingly difficult to make a commensurate increase in the size of its own forces, which now stand at about 545,000 men, including the regional and local defense forces but excluding the national police.

Combat deaths on both sides have been mounting—for the South Vietnamese from an average of 143 men a week in 1964, to about 270 a week for the 4-week period ending July 24 this year. Vietcong losses have gone from 322 a week last year to about 680 a week for the 4-week period ending July 24.

Most important, the ratio of South Vietnamese to Vietcong strength has seriously declined in the last 6 or 7 months from about 5 to 1 to about 3 or 3½ to 1; the ratio of combat battalions is substantially less. This is far too low a ratio for a guerrilla war even though the greater mobility and firepower provided to the South Vietnamese forces by the United States help to offset that disadvantage.

The South Vietnamese forces have to defend hundreds of cities, towns, and hamlets while the Vietcong are free to choose the time and place of their attack. As a result, the South Vietnamese are stretched thin in defensive positions, leaving only a small central reserve for offensive action against the Vietcong, while the latter are left free to concentrate their forces and throw them against selected targets. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Vietcong retains most of the initiative.

Even so, we may not as yet have seen the full weight of the Communist attack. Presently, the situation is particularly acute in the northern part of the country where the Communists have mobilized large military forces which pose a threat to the entire region and its major cities and towns. Our air attack may have helped to keep these forces off balance but the threat remains and it is very real.

Clearly, the time has come when the people of South Vietnam need more help from us and other nations if they are to retain their freedom and independence.

We have already responded to that need with some 75,000 U.S. military personnel, including some combat units. This number will be raised to 125,000 almost immediately with the deployment of the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces. But, more help will be needed in the months ahead and additional U.S. combat forces will be required to back up the hard-pressed Army of South Vietnam. Two other nations have provided combat forces—Australia and New Zealand. We hope that by the end of this year others will join them. In this regard, the Koreans have just recently approved a combat division for deployment to Vietnam, which is scheduled to arrive this fall.

Role of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam

As I noted earlier, the central reserve of the South Vietnamese Army has been seriously depleted in recent months. The principal role of U.S. ground combat forces will be to supplement this reserve in support of the frontline forces of the South Vietnamese Army. The indigenous paramilitary forces will deal with the pacification of areas cleared of organized Vietcong and North Vietnamese units, a role more appropriate for them than for our forces.

The Government of South Vietnam's strategy, with which we concur, is to achieve the initiative, to expand gradually its area of control by breaking up major concentrations of enemy forces, using to the maximum our preponderance of airpower, both land and sea based. The number of fixed-wing attack sorties by U.S. aircraft in South Vietnam will increase manifold by the end of year.

Armed helicopter sorties will also increase dramatically over the same period, and extension use will be made of heavy artillery, both land based and sea based. At the same time our air and naval forces will continue to interdict the Vietcong supplies line from North Vietnam, both land and sea.

Although our tactics have changed, our objective remains the same.

We have no desire to widen the war. We have no desire to overthrow the North Vietnamese regime, seize its territory or achieve the unification of North and South Vietnam by force of arms. We have no need for permanent military bases in South Vietnam or for special privileges of any kind.

What we are seeking through the planned military buildup is to block the Vietcong offensive, to give the people of South Vietnam and their armed forces some relief from the unrelenting Communist pressures—to give them time to strengthen their government, to reestablish law and order, and to revive their economic life which has been seriously disrupted by Vietcong harassment and attack in recent months. We have no illusions that success will be achieved quickly, but we are confident that it will be achieved much more surely by the plan I have outlined.

Increases in U.S. military forces

Fortunately, we have greatly increased the strength and readiness of our Military Establishment since 1961, particularly in the kinds of forces which we now require in southeast Asia. The Active Army has been expanded from 11 to 16 combat ready divisions. Twenty thousand men have been added to the Marine Corps to allow them to fill out their combat structure and at the same time facilitate the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve. The tactical fighter squadrons of the Air Force have been increased by 51 percent. Our airlift capability has more than doubled. Special forces trained to deal with insurgency threats have been multiplied elevenfold. General ship construction and conversion has been doubled.

During this same period, procurement for the expanded force has been increased greatly: Air Force tactical aircraft—from \$360 million in 1961 to about \$1.1 billion in the original fiscal year 1966 budget; Navy aircraft—from \$1.8 billion to \$2.2 billion; Army helicopters—from 286 aircraft to over 1,000. Procurement of ordnance, vehicles and related equipment was increased about 150 percent in the fiscal years 1962-64 period, compared with the proceeding 3 years. The tonnage of modern nonnuclear air-to-ground ordnance in stock tripled between fiscal year 1961 and fiscal year 1965. In brief, the Military Establishment of the United States, today, is in far better shape than it ever has been in peacetime to face whatever tasks may lie ahead.

Nevertheless, some further increases in forces, military personnel, production, and construction will be required if we are to deploy additional forces to southeast Asia and provide for combat consumption while at the same time, maintaining our capabilities to deal with crises elsewhere in the world.

To offset the deployments now planned to southeast Asia, and provide some additional forces for possible new deployments, we propose to increase the presently authorized force levels. These increases will be of three types: (1) Additional units for the Active Forces, over and above those reflected in the January budget; (2) military personnel augmentations for presently authorized units in the Active Forces to man new bases, to handle the larger logistics workload, etc.; and (3) additional personnel and extra training for selected Reserve component units to increase their readiness for quick deployment. We believe we can achieve this buildup without calling up the Reserves or ordering the involuntary extension of tours, except as already authorized by law for the Department of the Navy. Even here the extension of officer tours will be on a selective basis and extensions for enlisted men will be limited, in general, to not more than 4 months.

The program I have outlined here today and the \$1.7 billion amendment to the fiscal year 1966 Defense appropriation bill now before the committee will, in the collective judgment of my principal military and civilian advisers and myself, provide the men, materiel, and facilities required to fulfill the President's pledge to meet the mounting aggression in South Vietnam, while at the same time maintaining the forces required to meet commitments elsewhere in the world.

THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN NEED

(Address by the President to the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists, the White House, May 13, 1965)

The third face of the war

The war in Vietnam has many faces.

There is the face of armed conflict—of terror and gunfire—of bomb-heavy planes and campaign-wary soldiers. * * *

The second face of war in Vietnam is the quest for a political solution—the face of diplomacy and politics—the ambitions and the interest of other nations. * * *

The third face of war in Vietnam is, at once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It is the face of human need. It is the unintended sick, the hungry family, and the illiterate child. It is men and women, many without shelter, with rags for clothing, struggling for survival in a very rich and a very fertile land.

It is the most important battle of all in which we are engaged.

For a nation cannot be built by armed power or by political agreement. It will rest on the expectation by individual men and women that their future will be better than their past.

It is not enough to just fight against something. People must fight for something, and the people of South Vietnam must know that

after the long, brutal journey through the dark tunnel of conflict there breaks the light of a happier day. And only if this is so can they be expected to sustain the enduring will for continued strife. Only in this way can longrun stability and peace come to their land.

And there is another, more profound reason. In Vietnam communism seeks to really impose its will by force of arms. But we would be deeply mistaken to think that this was the only weapon. Here, as other places in the world, they speak to restless people—people rising to shatter the old ways which have imprisoned hope—people fiercely and justly fighting for the material fruits from the tree of modern knowledge.

It is this desire, and not simply lust for conquest, which moves many of the individual fighting men that we must now, sadly, call the enemy.

It is, therefore, our task to show that freedom from the control of other nations offers the surest road to progress, that history and experience testify to this truth. But it is not enough to call upon reason or point to examples. We must show it through action and we must show it through accomplishment, and even were there no war—either hot or cold—we would always be active in humanity's search for progress.

This task is commanded to us by the moral values of our civilization, and it rests on the inescapable nature of the world that we have now entered. For in that world, as long as we can foresee, every threat to man's welfare will be a threat to the welfare of our own people. Those who live in the emerging community of nations will ignore the perils of their neighbors at the risk of their own prospects.

Cooperative development in southeast Asia

This is true not only for Vietnam but for every part of the developing world. This is why, on your behalf, I recently proposed a massive, cooperative development effort for all of southeast Asia. I named the respected leader, Eugene Black, as my personal representative to inaugurate our participation in these programs.

Since that time rapid progress has been made, I am glad to report. Mr. Black has met with the top officials of the United Nations on several occasions. He has talked to other interested parties. He has found increasing enthusiasm. The United Nations is already setting up new mechanisms to help carry forward the work of development.

In addition, the United States is now prepared to participate in, and to support, an Asian Development Bank, to carry out and help finance the economic progress in that area of the world and the development that we desire to see in that area of the world.

So this morning I call on every other industrialized nation, including the Soviet Union, to help create a better life for all of the people of southeast Asia.

Surely, surely, the works of peace can bring men together in a common effort to abandon forever the works of war.

But, as South Vietnam is the central place of conflict, it is also a principal focus for our work to increase the well-being of people.

It is that effort in South Vietnam, of which I think we are too little informed, which I want to relate to you this morning.

Strengthening Vietnam's economy

We began in 1954, when Vietnam became independent, before the war between the north and the south. Since that time we have spent more than \$2 billion in economic help for the 16 million people of South Vietnam. And despite the ravages of war, we have made steady, continuing gains. We have concentrated on food and health and education and housing and industry.

Like most developing countries, South Vietnam's economy rests on agriculture. Unlike many, it has large uncrowded areas of very rich and very fertile land. Because of this, it is one of the great rice bowls of the entire world. With our help, since 1954, South Vietnam has already doubled its rice production, providing food for the people as well as providing a vital export for that nation.

We have put our American farm know-how to work on other crops. This year, for instance, several hundred million cuttings of a new variety of sweet potato, that promises a sixfold increase in yield will be distributed to these Vietnamese farmers. Corn output should rise from 25,000 tons in 1962 to 100,000 tons by 1966. Pig production has more than doubled since 1955. Many animal diseases have been eliminated entirely.

Disease and epidemic brood over every Vietnamese village. In a country of more than 16 million people with a life expectancy of only 35 years, there are only 200 civilian doctors. If the Vietnamese had doctors in the same ratio as the United States has doctors, they would have not the 200 that they do have but they would have more than 5,000 doctors.

We have helped vaccinate, already, over 7 million people against cholera, and millions more against other diseases. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese can now receive treatment in the more than 12,000 hamlet health stations that America has built and has stocked. New clinics and surgical suites are scattered throughout the entire country; and the medical school that we are now helping to build will graduate as many doctors in a single year as now serve the entire civilian population of South Vietnam.

Education is the keystone of future development in Vietnam. It takes trained people to man the factories, to conduct the administration, and to form the human foundation for an advancing nation. More than a quarter million young Vietnamese can now learn in more than 4,000 classrooms that America has helped to build in the last 2 years; and 2,000 more schools are going to be built by us in the next 12 months. The number of students in vocational schools has gone up four times. Enrollment was 300,000 in 1955, when we first entered there and started helping with our program. Today it is more than 1,500,000. The 8 million textbooks that we have supplied to Vietnamese children will rise to more than 15 million by 1967.

Agriculture is the foundation. Health, education, and housing are the urgent human needs. But industrial development is the great pathway to their future.

When Vietnam was divided, most of the industry was in the North. The South was barren of manufacturing and the foundations for industry. Today more than 700 new or rehabilitated factories—textile mills and cement plants, electronics and plastics—are changing the entire face of that nation. New roads and communications, railroad equipment, and electric generators are a spreading base on which the new industry can, and is, growing.

Progress in the midst of war

All this progress goes on, and it is going to continue to go on, under circumstances of staggering adversity.

Communist terrorists have made aid programs that we administer a very special target of their attack. They fear them, because agricultural stations are being destroyed and medical centers are being burned. More than 100 Vietnamese malaria fighters are dead. Our own AID officials have been wounded and kidnapped. These are not just the accidents of war. They are a part of a deliberate campaign, in the words of the Communists, "to cut the fingers off the hands of the Government."

We intend to continue, and we intend to increase our help to Vietnam.

Nor can anyone doubt the determination of the South Vietnamese themselves. They have lost more than 12,000 of their men since I became your President a little over a year ago.

But progress does not come from investment alone, or plans on a desk, or even the directives and the orders that we approve here in Washington. It takes men. Men must take the seed to the farmer. Men must teach the use of fertilizer. Men must help in harvest. Men must build the schools, and men must instruct the students. Men must carry medicine into the jungle, and treat the sick, and shelter the homeless. And men—brave, tireless, filled with love for their fellows—are doing this today. They are doing it through the long, hot, danger-filled Vietnamese days and the sultry nights.

The fullest glory must go, also, to those South Vietnamese that are laboring and dying for their own people and their own nation. In hospitals and schools, along the rice fields and the roads, they continue to labor, never knowing when death or terror may strike.

How incredible it is that there are a few who still say that the South Vietnamese do not want to continue the struggle. They are sacrificing and they are dying by the thousands. Their patient valor in the heavy presence of personal physical danger should be a helpful lesson to those of us who, here in America, only have to read about it, or hear about it on the television or radio.

We have our own heroes who labor at the works of peace in the midst of war. They toil unarmed and out of uniform. They know the humanity of their concern does not exempt them from the horrors of conflict, yet they go on from day to day. They bring food to the hungry over there. They supply the sick with necessary medicine. They help the farmer with his crops, families to find clean water, villages to receive the healing miracles of electricity. These are Americans who have joined our AID program, and we welcome others to their ranks.

A call for aid

For most Americans this an easy war. Men fight and men suffer and men die, as they always do in war. But the lives of most of us, at least those of us in this room and those listening to me this morning, are untroubled. Prosperity rises, abundance increases, the Nation flourishes.

I will report to the Cabinet when I leave this room that we are in the 51st month of continued prosperity, the longest peacetime prosperity for America since our country was founded. Yet our entire future is at stake.

What a difference it would make if we could only call upon a small fraction of our unmatched private resources—businesses and unions, agricultural groups and builders—if we could call them to the task of peaceful progress in Vietnam. With such a spirit of patriotic sacrifice we might well strike an irresistible blow for freedom there and for freedom throughout the world.

I therefore hope that every person within the sound of my voice in this country this morning will look for ways—and those citizens of other nations who believe in humanity as we do, I hope that they will find ways to help progress in South Vietnam.

This, then, is the third face of our struggle in Vietnam. It was there—the illiterate, the hungry, the sick—before this war began. It will be there when peace comes to us—and so will we—not with soldiers and planes, not with bombs and bullets, but with all the wondrous weapons of peace in the 20th century.

And then, perhaps, together all of the people of the world can share that gracious task with all the people of Vietnam, North and South alike.

VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE: "WINNING THE PEACE" (CBS News Special Report as broadcast over the CBS television network, August 23, 1965)

Participants: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy.

Reporters: CBS News United Nations Correspondent Richard C. Houtelet, CBS News Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb, CBS News White House Correspondent Harry Reasoner.

ANNOUNCER. This is the third of four special 1-hour broadcasts by CBS News, Vietnam Perspective. In the past 2 weeks, the new decisions and the American military effort in Vietnam were examined. Tonight, "Winning the Peace."

The paths to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam will be discussed by three Government officials. Now here is CBS News White House Correspondent Harry Reasoner.

MR. REASONER. Good evening. We're in the John Quincy Adams Room of the State Department in Washington for the third in our series of programs with the U.S. policymakers on Vietnam. Across from me are three distinguished officials whose task it is to pursue perhaps the most difficult and illusive of our objectives in Vietnam, the pursuit of peace.

We're happy to have back with us the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who with the President formulates our foreign policy and who heads our diplomatic offensive in southeast Asia.

This is our newly designated Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, who is exploring the avenues of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam through U.N. channels.

And this is McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, who has played a key role in the formulation of our policies in Vietnam and who, a few weeks ago on this network, defended the administration's position with some professors who disagree with it.

Seated with me are two CBS news colleagues, Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb, who regularly covers the State Department and who is just back from one of many trips to Russia. And U.N. Correspondent Richard C. Houtelet.

Gentlemen, I'd like to begin with a fairly basic question. It's been quite a weekend in Vietnam. We bombed close to China again. We bombed for the first time some targets that could be described as less directly military than before, and there is a kind of new optimism about how the ground fighting is going. Is this the moment? Is this the time for negotiations? I'd like each of you to reply to that briefly. Secretary Rusk?

MR. RUSK. Well, that depends on the other side in their assessment of the situation. We have been ready for a long time to make peace in southeast Asia. Our problem is to get the other side to the conference table. We just don't know. The other side must make that decision.

MR. REASONER. Ambassador Goldberg?

MR. GOLDBERG. I think any time is a good time for negotiations. The only way to resolve conflict is to go to the bargaining table, to use a term that I am very well familiar with, and it seems to me that this is not determined by the calendar, or even by the course of military events. This is determined by the genuine desire of the parties to the conflict to remove the problem from the battlefield to the bargaining table. So for me, any time is a good time to negotiate.

MR. REASONER. Mr. Bundy?

MR. BUNDY. Well, it's certainly true that it is our position that now is a good time to negotiate. We have had that view for many months, have tried to make it clear in every way, public and private, at every level of discourse, from the President on down. It is also true that the response from Hanoi, still more from Peking, has been consistently and

powerfully negative. No later than a week ago, in an interview with the correspondent of the French newspaper *Le Monde*, Ho of Hanoi made it very plain that they were not prepared to negotiate except on terms of all power to the Communists. I believe it to be true that military success of the kind which we have seen in recent days does help us bring nearer the day when there will be effective negotiation.

MR. HOUTELET. It also reinforces the question that some people have asked of whether you ought to negotiate at all, or whether, if you find the tables turning your way, if you are gaining any kind of military ascendancy, whether you shouldn't use that advantage, press it to checkmate Communist aggression, which is the U.S. professed aim, not only in Vietnam, but all through southeast Asia and Laos and in northeast Thailand and Malaysia as well. In other words, why should we negotiate, is the question.

MR. BUNDY. I think all of us would agree, and I know this to be the position of President Johnson, that we are ready to negotiate and that we are not disposed to take the view that because the battle is going well we are unwilling to talk about it. In our view, the effort to end the aggression must continue, while the aggression continues, but we are prepared for discussion and for negotiation at any time.

MR. KALB. There is in the air right now in Washington something which has not been here before, at least in the past couple of months, and that is a wistful kind of feeling that maybe there is some optimism here and some grounds for optimism. I'd like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, what are the grounds for optimism? What is the evidence that gives rise to this sense?

MR. RUSK. Well, I think the fact that President Johnson has made it very clear that we are not going to be pushed out of South Vietnam and that we shall meet our commitments to South Vietnam has made a big difference to this situation. I think also the fact that international opinion is not supporting the effort of Hanoi to take over South Vietnam makes a difference, because I think they were hoping at one time that there would be a buildup of international opinion that might cause the United States to change its attitude toward our commitment.

MR. GOLDBERG. Gentlemen, may I make an observation on the Secretary's statement? New to diplomacy, I have been reading in diplomacy. Talleyrand made a statement about the Vienna Congress in which he said that the great powers there assembled were too frightened to fight and too stupid to agree. And I think in a very simple measure, we can say of American foreign policy in this situation, that it is clear from what the President has said, from what the Secretary of State has said, Mr. Bundy said in his teach-ins, that the United States very definitely is not too frightened to fight. That has been demonstrated.

MR. RUSK. Let me come back, Mr. Kalb, if I may, to Mr. Bundy's reference to the interview in *Le Monde*—Ho Chi Minh on August 14. He seemed to be saying there that a precondition for peace is the withdrawal of American forces. Well, under the circumstances, this is quite an unrealistic point of view, because those forces are there solely because of the intervention of outside forces from Hanoi in South Vietnam. Now one would suppose that peace requires that there be a withdrawal of those North Vietnamese forces that have penetrated into South Vietnam. If you don't like the word "withdrawal," you can use the word "redeployment," but it is that infiltration which is solely responsible for the presence of American combat forces in South Vietnam.

Now, obviously, we and others have been giving a good deal of thought to the basis on which peace can be achieved. I think the entire record of the United States since 1945

shows that we want peace and not war and that all of our effort in this postwar period has been directed to that end. Well, now, in South Vietnam, the cessation of outside aggression, the cessation of this infiltration from the north is certainly fundamental because that would make it possible for American forces to come home. We should like to see full performance on all sides of the military clauses of the 1954 agreements. We have said repeatedly, time after time, that as far as the United States is concerned, we have no interest in military bases or a permanent military presence in southeast Asia. Well, now, that is in accord with the 1954 agreements and that should be one of the essential elements of a peaceful settlement.

Now as far as South Vietnam internally is concerned, we have a deep commitment to the simple notion of self-determination. In the 1954 agreements, it was anticipated that there would be elections, through secret elections—through secret ballot, and that the peoples of Vietnam, north and south, would have a chance to express their—their opinions, and we are prepared for elections in South Vietnam to determine what the people of that country want in terms of their own institutions.

And then the question of reunification which has been troublesome over the years. Again, it is instinctive with the United States to say, What do the people want? What do the people want? And there again, to find out in North Vietnam and South Vietnam what the people themselves really want on this matter is important. Now, this isn't very simple. And it doesn't mean that both are going to want reunification. The people in the north would want reunification only if there were a Communist regime throughout the country. The people in the south don't want reunification on that basis, but it is for the people of Vietnam to decide that at such time as they have a chance to express their views freely on that point. So what we are talking about here are the simple elements of a settlement which were reached basically in 1954, and again in 1963 in the Laotian agreements.

MR. HOUTELET. Mr. Goldberg, you sit at probably the most sensitive listening post in the world. Do you get any indication from the—your colleagues at the United Nations that the other side has gotten this message of—that we are not too frightened to fight, not too stupid to talk?

MR. GOLDBERG. Not yet. Not yet in all candor. We have to persevere with patience, and experience, and hope. Our message is loud and clear. The signal that the Secretary has referred to on occasion, saying that negotiations will take place when you hear a signal, has been made by the United States. Our President has stated publicly to the world that we are prepared to sit down in unconditional negotiations, discussing the points that Hanoi has made, discussing the points we have made and to arrive at a durable settlement, a durable settlement. I am hopeful—I am hopeful—and I continue in this hope that we will get a similar signal from the other side. It's very simple to make that signal. The President did it at Baltimore. He did it on other occasions. He has done it since. He armed me with a letter to the Secretary General when we said very plainly that we are ready to negotiate unconditionally all problems and to negotiate on the basis of their position and our position, and I think we are looking for a signal from the other side.

MR. REASONER. Mr. Secretary, I think that there's some confusion in this country about these 1954 agreements which are mentioned so often. For instance, I don't know how many Americans realize it's an agreement that we didn't sign. Does—could you outline why we did not sign that and if we would sign a similar agreement now?

MR. RUSK. Well, we did not formally sign those agreements, but Gen. Bedell Smith,

who was then Under Secretary of State, made a statement at the time which in effect embraced those agreements on behalf of the United States, and said that any attempt to violate those agreements by force would be looked upon by the United States as a threat to the peace. So that we do believe that the 1954 agreements, in their essential principles, do provide a basis for peace in southeast Asia. What we do not believe is that the settlement of 1954 can be upset by force by any party.

Mr. REASONER. Mr. Bundy, for reasons which you've explained, and the President has explained, the war in Vietnam has gotten bigger. Our participation in it has increased. How do we know that it won't continue to escalate until eventually we have World War III? Is there some kind of a tacit understanding on how far both sides go?

Mr. BUNDY. I know of no tacit understanding, Mr. Reasoner, but I think it is fair to say that all parties—and all those concerned—are aware of the danger of enlargement of the conflict. We certainly are on our side. We have lived with crises large and small over a 20-year period now—in Berlin, in Greece, in Korea, in Cuba, and elsewhere—and I think Americans can be proud of the care and the prudence and the restraint which their Government has shown in this generation of effort. Under the leadership of President Johnson—a man of peace if there ever was one—we are conducting our affairs in that tradition and with that purpose of restraint. We believe that there is a similar recognition—although not always a similar recognition of the rights of others—there is a similar recognition of the hazards of any great enlargement of the conflict on the part of the parties interested on the other side. We cannot be sure of what they will do. We can be sure, and we must be accountable for what we do, and that is why our entire effort has been directed at things related specifically to what is being done to and in South Vietnam. That's what we are concerned with; not the fate of any other regime elsewhere; not the safety or security of any larger power nearby which we do not threaten. We are concerned with the fulfillment of our obligations in South Vietnam, a limited objective, and the nature of those limitations we've made just as clear as we know how.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Bundy, could you convince us, and thereby provide us with the evidence that leads you to feel that the American bombing of North Vietnam is specifically related to acts of terrorism in South Vietnam, and that this will convince the Vietcong operations in South Vietnam that they must stop what they're doing?

Mr. BUNDY. No, the bombing in North Vietnam is not—I would not relate it specifically and directly to any one action in South Vietnam, but to the campaign in South Vietnam and to the program pursued by Hanoi against South Vietnam it is related and related most directly. The targets are military targets: military lines of communication, military barracks, military depots. There has been no miscellaneous bombing of any old target in North Vietnam or anywhere so far as we can avoid it. The targets have been directly related to a campaign of infiltration, a campaign of military control, and a campaign of organized terror where the heartbeat of that campaign is in Hanoi.

Mr. HORTELET. Getting back to China, I've heard the assumption expressed that China will not intervene directly in Vietnam as long as the regime—the Communist regime of North Vietnam—is not in danger of being overthrown, and as long as there is no massive incursion of American power on the ground. Is this, in fact, an assumption that guides your policy?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think we are at some hazard in trying to think like the members of the Politburo in Peiping. It is my impression that the Communist world does not want a general war over southeast Asia. Unfortunately, some of them want southeast Asia. Therefore, we cannot be completely sure at the end of the trial which desire on their part will predominate. But, the authorities in Peiping must know that they have undertaken to support an effort in South Vietnam right up against an American commitment of which they were fully informed. Therefore, they must recognize that there are very large hazards if they themselves elect to pursue this by direct intervention. Now we, therefore, have been acting with a combination of firmness and prudence in an effort to keep wide open the doors of peaceful settlement. This has characterized American policy in all of these post-war crises to which Mr. McGeorge Bundy referred, and we would hope very much that the time will come when it will be recognized on the other side that pushing this matter militarily is not worth the risk at the end of the trial, and therefore, that they will bring this to the conference table for settlement.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, there are a number of people in Washington who study the China problem who believe that, on the contrary, it is precisely a war in southeast Asia that the Chinese want. It is precisely the bogging down of an enormous number of American troops in southeast Asia that the Chinese want, both for internal political reasons as well as a justification of their position in terms of their quarrel with the Russians. What evidence can you provide that, indeed, the Chinese—I'm not talking about the Russians now—do not really want this kind of—a larger and deeper American involvement, even running the risk of war with America?

Mr. RUSK. Well, one can only judge by their actions thus far and by impressions one gets from those who have been in touch with Peiping. There is a comment going around in the Communist world these days that Peiping is prepared to fight to the last Vietnamese. There is a certain caution and prudence in their action, more so than in their words, but when you analyze these matters from the point of view of basic national interest, objectively in terms of what can be at the root of their thinking, I myself cannot believe that it is a rational idea that the principal powers involved in this business could look with favor upon the outbreak of a general war. It doesn't make sense from anyone's point of view.

Now, that means that it is important to do what we can, not to let events take control; to try to keep some sort of control over the situation so that contacts among the capitals might have a chance to find a way to a peaceful settlement. And that is one of the reasons why, one of the principal reasons why President Johnson has tried to act with the combination of the firmness and prudence that he believes the situation requires.

Mr. BUNDY. Could I pick up from what the Secretary said for one moment and say that, in the first place, that nothing is more important than the maintenance of prudence and of effective control of our own operations by our own Government. That's the meaning of the insistent, direct surveillance which the President maintains over major military decisions, and specifically, over decisions which affect military action against North Vietnam. This is a matter which he keeps under his own control by the consent and with the support of the senior military commanders concerned.

And just one more point. Obviously, the Chinese would be delighted to have us mismanage our affairs in South Vietnam and in

southeast Asia so that we got more and more engaged in something less and less successful. It is our object and our purpose and our responsibility to do a better job than that, and to do that job within the limits of prudence, restraint, and decency which we are trying to follow.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Could I summarize American policy in this area by quoting an ancient Greek wise man, Polybius, who said that "the purpose of war"—and I would describe it in terms of our attitude toward Hanoi—"is not to annihilate the enemy, but to get him to mend his ways." And this, in fact, is what we have been attempting to do, prevent aggression, and this has been made clear time and time again. We—the President said, my distinguished predecessor at the United Nations said, we don't covet any territory, we don't seek to establish any military bases; we are acting the way we do to stop aggression, not to promote aggression, I think the dangers of a general war are minimized.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Ambassador, the—everything that you said is certainly true, and this is precisely what the administration is saying. At the same time, people said in the Chinese capital, who have to view it from the point of view of their national interest—you can say that we're not building bases around China, but when the Chinese leaders look out at the map, they can see the presence of American military forces from one end of the Chinese border to the other. When you bomb, as we did today, to within 31 miles of the Chinese border, people responsible for Chinese national security probably would look with some great concern about that. I am trying to understand what makes you feel that they're not that deeply concerned, or that they don't feel that bombing 31 miles on this side of the border might not lead to 31 miles on the other side of the border.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr. Kalb, for a very simple reason: because we have stated as a matter of direct public policy to the world, a commitment which America has made to everybody, that if aggression ceases from the north, our activities in South Vietnam will likewise cease. This is a pretty broad statement, quite different from statements that were made by other powers at other points in the history of South and North Vietnam.

Mr. HORTELET. There was a time in the Korean war after the cessation of fire, and before the armistice was signed, when—as President Eisenhower revealed not long ago—he got tired of waiting for the Chinese to sign the armistice and threatened or promised to use all American power, including nuclear power, against the Chinese. He said they got the message and they came to the conference table. Can you envisage any similar circumstances in Vietnam?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think we'll have to let that question ride for the future. There already was a negotiation going on at that time, and the problem was to bring it to a final conclusion. In a major sense, the fighting had already been brought to a conclusion by the earlier discussions of the cease-fire. We may get to a point where a cease-fire gets to be the crucial element there in Vietnam.

Mr. Kalb, if I could return to your point just for a second. I don't believe that ideological differences are as profound as to cause Peiping to be concerned about what they see around their borders when they know that we would come home if Hanoi would leave South Vietnam alone, and that we would not have bases or troops in southeast Asia if these countries could live in peace. Now they can pretend, given their ideological commitments, that they somehow are afraid that we have in mind a major attack on China. There's nothing in the record to show that. Nothing in the conduct

of the last 15 or 20 years to give any support to that idea.

Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, you are suggesting then that the American confrontation—if I can use that large word—in southeast Asia is really the United States and North Vietnam and not the broader confrontation of the United States and Communist China?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think, in the first instance, it is clear that what Hanoi is doing is our principal problem and explains why we're in South Vietnam with military forces, so that we're not involved in a confrontation, the purpose of which, on our side, is to destroy the regime in Peiping. We have two divisions in Korea because among other things, several hundred thousand Chinese came into the Korean war in 1950-51 and this posed a problem of the security of South Korea. But throughout this postwar period force has been initiated by the other side. The free world has had to meet that force with determination, but the free world has also met it with the kind of prudence and restraint that keeps open the doors of peaceful settlement. And all I would say on that to our colleagues in Peiping, if they want to test whether or not the United States is aggressive, then let them live at peace with their neighbors and they would find out that the United States is not aggressive with respect to mainland China.

Mr. KALB. We're talking in a kind of a shorthand, though, sir. Isn't it more direct in some way at this stage, given the dimension of the danger, to have a more direct link of communication with the Chinese Communists? I'm aware of the Warsaw conversations, but we've had enormous political differences with the Russians; we've been able to establish a hot line to Moscow. What about some kind of line directly to Peiping?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think we've had more discussions with Peiping over the last 10 years on more important subjects than has any government that recognizes Peiping, with the possible exception of Moscow. Our problem with Peiping is not communication. Our problem is that when we have talks with them, they begin by saying that there can be no improvement in the situation until we are prepared to surrender Formosa to the mainland, and that means turning over 11 million people against their will to Peiping, and we make it clear that this is not possible, and I must confess, the conversation gets to be implacable and harsh and takes well-known lines as represented in the public statements of the two sides.

Mr. BUNDY. Going by their own conversations, Mr. Kalb, and their own—what they say to journalists, the few and rare ones whom they receive, the Peiping government itself has said over and over again, framing the matter in its own terms, that what is at issue in Vietnam is fundamentally a matter for the Vietnamese people to decide. This is exactly what we think. We believe that the center of this question is in what is being done to and in South Vietnam. It is not in Peiping, except as they may be engaged in support and assistance to those who are attempting to destroy a given society and replace it with one fashioned in their own image. And I believe the people in Peiping know that, and I believe they understand clearly that it is only by their action and by their decision that there can be the kind of enlargement which would involve direct danger to them.

Mr. REASONER. This question has come up several times about letting the people of Vietnam decide what they want to do. Is this, indeed, the case, or is it a case, as in other U.S. policy, where there are limitations, where there are certain options denied them? Suppose South Vietnam decided that it wished to make a separate peace. Would we accept it?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, I think when you asked that question earlier to Ambassador Taylor

he said that he just didn't think that was a realistic possibility. My own judgment is, on the basis of one short visit and innumerable reports and a great many discussions with others who have been there much longer, that there is no problem, from our side, of confidence in the ability of the people of South Vietnam, given a free choice and conditions of reasonable peace, to frame their own future in ways with which we would be happy to live; that it is an unreal question to suppose that they would freely choose to cast their lot with the Communists.

Mr. REASONER. Nevertheless—

Mr. BUNDY. There is a great deal of—

Mr. REASONER. It is not an unreal question, to this extent: that some intelligence estimates this spring indicated this would be a possibility. Now, if—even if it is unlikely—

Mr. BUNDY. I am not aware of those—

Mr. REASONER. It must be something we consider.

Mr. BUNDY. Intelligence estimates, Mr. Reasoner. Really not—

Mr. REASONER. Well, then put it on a purely hypothetical basis. To think through the unthinkable, what would be our attitude? Would we accept it?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, let me put it the other way around, and say that the United States is obviously not in a position to make the kind of effort and to make the kind of sacrifices which we are making if there were not effort and sacrifice by the people and Government of the country to which we are giving assistance. There is that kind of effort. There is that kind of sacrifice. Our attention focuses most naturally upon the battles in which Americans are heavily engaged, and we feel, most naturally, American casualties. But the rate of casualties and the rate of effort is running many times to one on the Vietnamese side as between us.

Mr. HOTTELET. Are there any points on which the peace aims of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam do not coincide?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, there's a constant problem of discussion over the exact ways in which we would state our peace aims, but the current situation is that—and the Secretary can speak to this better than I can—that the Foreign Minister of the Government of South Vietnam, and the Secretary himself, have made closely parallel statements about our peace aims.

Mr. REASONER. I don't mean to be offensive, and I certainly recognize your right to decline to answer this question, but in Santo Domingo we retained a possibility of a veto over a government. This was clear. This denied certain options to people in the way of self-determination. Do we retain similar veto over possible decisions out of Vietnam?

Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Reasoner, you're talking about an island I love. I was down there. And the point that I think needs to be made is rather that these two situations are closely parallel. Our action there, first to save lives, then to prevent a particular kind of Communist hazard, has developed into an action designed precisely to give a reasonable opportunity for the people of the Dominican Republic to make their own choice about the kind of government and the kind of society they want to have. Now, a small island in the Caribbean, and a newly independent country operating within international agreements which somewhat affect its international position on the other side of the world—these are two very different situations, but my own belief is that the fundamental purposes of the United States in both areas can be defined in the same broad terms.

Mr. RUSK. Mr. Reasoner, there's a very deep commitment of the American people to the simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and we have not seen a government, a Communist government, brought to power by the free election of its own people. Now,

we have overwhelming evidence from all sections, sectors, areas, groups, in South Vietnam that they do not want what Hanoi is offering to them in South Vietnam. Therefore, I do not believe that we need fear, from the point of view of freedom, that we need to fear what the effect would be of genuinely free elections among the people of South Vietnam. I've heard some people who were not, I think, in a very good position to know the details, speculate that 80 percent of the people in South Vietnam would elect Ho Chi Minh or accept Hanoi if they had a free election. That just doesn't fit any of the evidence that we have about the attitude of these people.

Mr. REASONER. I was thinking not so much of elections as of a coup which would put into power, without reference to the people—as essentially the present government is, without reference to a majority of the people; it's not established that way yet; they don't know how, Ambassador Lodge says—but if they had a government which wanted to make peace, do we retain veto power over that peace?

Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Reasoner, the coupmaking power, to put it in those terms, does rest, as Ambassador Taylor was suggesting last week, primarily with the military. There's no hint of this in the military. The people underestimate the degree of the commitment of all factions, not the Communists, to a non-Communist solution in South Vietnam. One of the principal Buddhist leaders said to one of our people the other day on a point that comes up occasionally with respect to negotiation, that he hoped very much that we would not give any international diplomatic recognition to the Vietcong. The Vietcong did not represent the South Vietnamese people, but only an agency of the Communists in the north. This is a—there are divisions and difficulties, many, varied and fascinating, among the non-Communist forces in South Vietnam, but not on this issue.

Mr. HOTTELET. The Vietcong has been treated as a monolithic force, which is really not human, because human beings are different and even if they are bound by a discipline or bemused by an ideology, they do have their own antecedents and they do have their own tastes. How much is being done now and what will be done more in the future to—to insert a wedge into the differences that must exist inside this theoretically monolithic Vietcong—the nationalists, the patriots, the people who are just peasants wanting to live a life of their own?

Mr. RUSK. Well, there are various elements in the National Liberation Front. I think it is true that not all of them are Communists, although the Communists have, in even recent weeks, declared that they are the dominant factor and they must themselves be the ones to give the orders. I think there may also be some tensions between some of the southerners and some of the northerners within the Liberation Front. But basically, they are united on the notion that the program of Liberation Front must be accepted as a solution for South Vietnam and that the Liberation Front itself must have a dominant role in the government there, regardless of the fact that this is not the wishes of the overwhelming majority of 14 million South Vietnamese.

Mr. GOLDBERG. May I add a word in this connection? I was looking at the Geneva agreement last night. The Geneva agreement, despite what is said in Hanoi, did not contemplate, nor does it say anything about a coalition government in which the Liberation Front would occupy the dominant role that Hanoi would like to accord it. The Geneva agreement says that "the Vietnamese people, north and south, should enjoy fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions"—I am reading—"established as

a result of free, general elections by secret ballot." Now, it's very interesting to see the contrast in positions. When we talk about returning to the essentials of the Geneva agreement, which Hanoi says it wants and which we say we subscribe to, we rely upon the fact that there shall be self-determination. Hanoi relies upon the fact that they should take over the government in their image before there are free elections. Well, we all have had a bit of history in this since the war. I don't recall after that has been done elsewhere that there have been any free elections. Now, surely the acid test is whether you are willing to subscribe to the principle of free elections. That, we have said, we are ready to subscribe to. If we are ready to subscribe to it, it must reflect a considerable degree of confidence—confidence which is lacking on the other side.

Mr. BUNDY. To put it another way, the Geneva Conference included as a participant the State of Vietnam. The current position from Hanoi is that there is no question of Saigon authorities. This is the very language of Ho Chi Minh, so what they wish to do is to foreclose the question of choice by the establishment as the only authentic representative, again his own language, their agent, controlled from within by a clearly Communist party, the Vietcong.

Mr. RUSK. And without elections.

Mr. KALE. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned before that—or Mr. Bundy did actually—that you and the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam have come out with statements that are rather similar as to what both countries want in South Vietnam. We have yet to hear what the Prime Minister of South Vietnam actually wants and there have been stories that there are possible differences already even in this early period of Ambassador Lodge's return, of differences between the two; the Prime Minister was not there when the Ambassador arrived. Do you feel, sir, that negotiations as we have been discussing them is in any way realistic, or possible, given the possibility of continued political instability in South Vietnam or the continued absence of statements from the new South Vietnamese governments that align themselves with us?

Mr. RUSK. Oh, I think the political instability in South Vietnam is itself directly related to violence in the countryside and the conditions of the war. During the Greek guerrilla operations, for example, there were some eight Greek governments in the period of some 15 months of guerrilla operations. It isn't easy to sustain an orderly government based upon elections throughout the countryside when thousands of local officials are being assassinated or kidnaped and when the normal processes of the economy are interrupted by sabotage of routes of communication, so that there is a connection between the political possibilities of what we would call a democratic and constitutional government and peace throughout the country. I have no doubt that—that the South Vietnamese themselves would move toward a government rooted in popular support and that this could be easily demonstrated if the conditions of peace made it possible for them to proceed on that basis. A few weeks ago, as you will recall, they did have provincial elections, for a large number of those who were eligible to vote did in fact register, over two thirds, and that some 78 percent of those who were registered did in fact vote, even though the Vietcong were opposing those provincial elections. There are multiple candidates. From our point of view, they were free elections and we can be—I think, take some confidence in the fact that if given a chance, if given some possibility of peace, these people in South Vietnam would know how to establish a government and base it upon popular support and get on with the main job which would be their first choice.

Mr. KALE. And yet, sir, the Prime Minister of the country, the air commodore, has expressed his impatience publicly with the politicians in South Vietnam. He's even expressed a certain admiration for dictators of the past. Do we really have a sense that this is the kind of government that we can go to the conference table with?

Mr. RUSK. Oh, I think that we can go to the conference table with the Government of South Vietnam. I think that their war aims and our war aims are basically the same and that if the country can get some peace, then there can be a rapid development of their political, economic, and social institutions in the direction which would cause all of us to applaud them and give them full support.

Mr. HOTTELET. You don't say, sir, that the war aims are identical. What are the points of difference?

Mr. RUSK. Well, perhaps I could say "identical" as far as my present knowledge is concerned. I'm not aware of any significant difference in the war aims of our two countries. The central thing, gentlemen, the central thing is that the aggression from the north, the infiltration of men and arms from the north, must be stopped and the South Vietnamese be allowed to work out their own problems themselves without the use of force from the outside. Now, this is the major, central, overriding point. The details are incidental to that central point and on that there's no difference between us and Saigon.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Can I phrase—rephrase the Secretary's remark in a simple way? I was writing it down as he said it. If we look at the public record, and the public record is not unimportant in this area, the goal of Hanoi policy as recently expressed is to wage a 20-year war to impose a Communist regime on South Vietnam. The goal of American and South Vietnamese policy is to determine their own destiny, by democratic means under conditions of peace.

Mr. RUSK. I think an examination of Hanoi's Peiping's, broadcasts in the last several months will indicate that they were leaning rather heavily on three points: one, that they could score a military success in South Vietnam—we know that will be denied to them; second, that international opinion somehow will build up in such a way as to put sufficient pressure on the United States to cause us to change our commitment to South Vietnam—we know that that will not occur. And, third, that divisions inside the United States will cause us to change our view of this matter—we don't believe that will occur. Therefore, Hanoi, I think, must face the fact that three essential pillars in their policy are weak pillars and, therefore, we would hope very much that they would realize that this matter must be brought to some conclusion.

Now, I don't want to exaggerate the role of public discussion and public debate. You'll recall, for example, that the Greek guerrilla problem was not settled in debate. At a certain stage the guerrillas simply began to wither away. You'll recall that the Berlin blockade was not lifted through a debate in the Security Council. It was done through private contacts ahead of time by—between the Soviet Union and the United States. Similarly, the Korean war was not settled in a debate in the United Nations. It was settled by contacts among the parties. And, therefore, we believe that we're in a period where the real views of the various parties need to be explored by channels that are available, in order to see whether the basis for a peace exists. I've indicated myself earlier in this program what seemed to us to be the main lines of a peaceful settlement as far as we're concerned. There are many details which can't be elaborated, because we're not at a negotiating table. But I do believe that it is important for us to pursue the quiet diplomacy, whether in the United

Nations or in other respects, because it is in that way that we shall, I think, get the key signals at some stage that might bring this to the conference table.

Mr. HOTTELET. But can one not hasten this process somewhat? Can one not ripen the quiet diplomacy by creating circumstances in which the other side will find it necessary to come to the conference table, by, for instance, dramatizing a desire to return to Geneva, or perhaps some dramatic, substantive but dramatic, approach by President Johnson—a summit conference on this problem, which I think everyone recognizes is a most serious problem?

Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr. Hottelet, how more dramatic can the President of the United States be? He made a public declaration about this in Baltimore, "unconditional discussions," and then some critics said that the President did not mean "negotiations." So then in the letter that he sent down with me to the Secretary General of the United Nations, he used the word "negotiations" to put at rest this thing that people were talking about. Following which, we sent a letter to the Security Council, in which we said, "We call upon anyone, any member, not only of the Security Council, but of the United Nations, to participate with us in this effort."

The 17 nonaligned nations made a proposal. We said that they would form the basis for a negotiation. And then—I can't go through all of the 15 efforts that were made. Mr. Davies went to Hanoi. We said that we welcomed that initiative. The Commonwealth ministers made a declaration. We said we welcomed that initiative. Mr. Nkrumah has indicated some interest; we did not discourage it.

I personally feel that you never denigrate any party nor a great nation by indicating a desire for peaceful resolution of a conflict. The President has done this. He's gone all out for this purpose.

Mr. HOTTELET. The purpose of my question, Mr. Goldberg, was to ask whether one could not do more than just indicate a willingness to accept, indicate acquiescence—

Mr. BUNDY. Well, we have done that, Mr. Hottelet, in the specific case that you mentioned. It seems to me that the fact is, and it's very clear, really, and increasingly recognized around the world, we are unconditionally ready for negotiations; we are unconditionally ready to return to Geneva if others are; we are unconditionally ready for the good offices of the United Nations in any way that they can be made effective; we are unconditionally ready to meet with all interested governments and go to work on this problem, and we have said so in every sharp and flat, and the President is fond of saying, in every State of the Union. And I believe the message has been heard.

Mr. KALE. Mr. Bundy, at one time there was an unadvertised pause in the bombing of North Vietnam. I wonder, sir, if the administration might not—in following up Dick's line of questioning—might not consider that an advertised or unadvertised effort along these same lines might not be contemplated, because the leaders in Hanoi—and you keep making reference to the other side—have certain things that they must go on, too—

Mr. BUNDY. Well—

Mr. KALE. In addition to public statements, they have the fact that they are being bombed.

Mr. BUNDY. You talked about this matter in this series a couple of weeks ago, and I think the Secretary then made the point that at the time of the unannounced pause there was information about its existence, was, in fact, conveyed to the governments most concerned, and in the first instance, to the government in Hanoi. They were in no doubt that this was happening. They were in no doubt that we would be watching to

see whether there was any response or any secondary action.

Anytime that we thought that there was a promise of action and response in terms of the reduction of the activities which had made this trouble, there would be no hesitation in the United States about making appropriate adjustments in our own military activity.

Mr. RUSK. Yes, I'd like to assure you that we have not been negligent in our business, and that hardly a week goes by that the other side doesn't have a chance to indicate what else would happen if the bombing ceased.

Now, I said in our earlier program that we would be willing to consider cessation of the bombing if it were a step toward peace. Now that remains open, that possibility. But what else would happen? Would the 325th North Vietnamese Division go home? Would there be a cessation of the bombing in South Vietnam, where it's occurring all the time among the South Vietnamese and against our own forces?

In other words, the target here is peace, and all of these incidental aspects of it ought to be fitted into a movement toward a genuine, permanent, peaceful settlement of this situation.

Mr. REASER. There's a question here I'd like to address to Mr. Bundy. If, as we seem to feel, that we have some years ahead of us, or some weeks or months or possibly years, making South Vietnam strong, waiting for a signal, what happens to the war in the meantime? It seems to get a little bigger all the time. Our participation seems to get stronger. Is there a limit to that?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, our actions there—and this is a point which I think Secretary McNamara spelled out with some care a couple of weeks ago on this program—our actions there have been essentially actions in response and in reply, and what has enlarged the war has been the increasing commitment directed from, supplied by and coming from, very often and increasingly, coming from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. Our own forces are there because of actions which have been necessary in response. That is why we feel so strongly that the question here as to whether it's going to get worse or better, the question as to when it will come to the peace table, is one in which one has to think about more than just the U.S. position.

Our determination is to assist and support a people who are defending themselves against an effort to make them a Communist power—part of a Communist power. That effort has been the effort which seemed necessary and appropriate at each stage, and only that much. We are not in a position to say to our countrymen in this country when that will end. We think that the American people understand why they are there, why these sacrifices are necessary. We hope that it will not grow larger, the conflict in South Vietnam. We will do what we can to limit it. But we cannot be unwilling and unready to do our part.

Mr. HORTELER. Looking ahead to the permanent peace settlement, you have stressed your adherence to the essentials of the Geneva Agreement and you have stressed the need for self-determination. When the United States refrained from signing the Geneva Agreement, Bedell Smith also suggested that free elections should be supervised by the United Nations. Do you see a role for the United Nations in making certain that any future Geneva Agreement on Vietnam is actually honored by those recitals?

Mr. RUSK. Yes, I would hope that the United Nations could play an important part in connection with any settlement. But that would depend upon the attitude of all the

parties, including Hanoi and Peiping, and thus far, both of those capitals have rather pushed aside and rejected participation by the United Nations. But if there could be organized an international inspection force, a police force, to supervise a peaceful settlement, if there could be a strong effort to build upon the capability of the United Nations to bring about economic and social development in the area, then I think there's a very important role for the United Nations in connection with the making and keeping of the peace, and I would hope very much that the other parties would make it possible for the United Nations to play that kind of role.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Before we leave this subject, may I make an observation on what Mr. Bundy just said. We are not the ones that are talking about a war that lasts 10 or 20 years. Ho Chi Minh has been talking about that. We are talking about a peace that should be negotiated here and now. Here and now.

Mr. BUNDY. That's a very important point. I'd like to just make one comment in finishing up on that. We don't know when, but the sooner the better, and we are absolutely sure that it is the order to all of us from our President, from our Nation's President, that we shall never be second, never be slow, never be without energy and imagination in trying to find ways of bringing a peaceful and decent settlement to this contest.

Mr. RUSK. Mr. Reasoner, it seems to me that each citizen in the United States has a special obligation in thinking about such a problem as South Vietnam. I think it really isn't enough just to worry about it and be concerned about it and be anxious about the future. Of course, all of us are concerned about it and anxious about the future. But each citizen might consider what he would do if he were the President of the United States, facing the choices faced by the President of the United States, to enter into the full agony of the question, what does the United States do in this situation? And I have no doubt that if each one of us should look very hard at the nature of the aggression, at the nature of the American commitment, the importance of the integrity of the American commitment, at the many efforts made to find a peaceful settlement, that the citizen would, thinking of himself as President for the moment, would conclude that we have to make good on our commitment, but at the same time we have to explore every possibility for a peaceful settlement. And that is what President Johnson is doing.

Mr. REASER. Gentlemen, I'd like to thank you very much for coming, as we leave some millions of citizens considering what they would do if they were the President of the United States. You may have spoiled a lot of people's sleep, Mr. Secretary.

Thus far in our four-part series on Vietnam, we have examined the critical decisions that our country faces, the questions of how we can win the war there; and tonight, how we can win the peace. Two weeks from tonight, on September 6, in the conclusion of Vietnam Perspective, we shall take a close look at what kind of a war it is we're fighting there. Teams of CBS news correspondents and camera crews will film a single day of combat at different locations to bring you, in color, Vietnam Perspective: "A Day of War." This is Harry Reasoner. Good night.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Todd] is recognized for 30 minutes.

[Mr. TODD addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

A PROUD RECORD

(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. CLEVENGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, the Members of this Congress and the President of this country can be proud of the record of the 1st session of the 89th Congress; we are not through yet, but what we have accomplished in the first 8 months of 1965 will long be remembered.

President Johnson well deserves the plaudits extended in the following birthday editorial which appeared in the August 27, 1965, edition of the New York Journal-American:

HAPPY DAY FOR L.B.J.

Doubtless there will be a cake and candles today as President Johnson observes his 57th birthday. It occurs to us that quite a large cake would be needed if each candle represented an achievement by L.B.J. in the not-quite 2 years he has been in office.

The President's domestic legislative accomplishments have astounded experts and fascinated the public, especially since many of them in the recent past were issues of fierce and seemingly insoluble controversy.

To name some of the big ones in this session of Congress alone:

Education, which extends benefits indirectly to pupils in Catholic and other non-profit private schools.

Medicare.

Voting Rights Act.

Creating a new Cabinet-rank Department of Housing and Urban Development.

War on poverty bill and aid to Appalachia, related but legislatively separate.

Water pollution control.

Presidential continuity.

Omnibus housing bill.

Excise tax reductions.

On the international scene, the President's policy in Vietnam has the support of a great majority of the people and most leaders of both parties.

Mr. Johnson has every reason, when he blows out those candles, to blow with gusto and satisfaction. Many happy returns, Mr. President.

STATEMENT OF HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER IN SUPPORT OF H.R. 1128, TO PROVIDE BENEFITS FOR VETERANS OF SERVICE AFTER JANUARY 31, 1955

(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. CLEVENGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, on August 31, 1965, I submitted the following statement to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs in support of my bill H.R. 1128, which would provide educational and other benefits to those of our citizens who served in the Armed Forces after January 31, 1955:

STATEMENT OF HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS IN SUPPORT OF H.R. 1128, TO PROVIDE EDUCATION AND OTHER BENEFITS FOR VETERANS OF SERVICE AFTER JANUARY 31, 1965

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to make this statement to your committee in support of my bill, H.R. 1128, which would provide vocational rehabilitation, education and training, and loan guaranty

September 1, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

21721

sociation, of Fort Lauderdale, and the vice president of the National League of Insured Savings Associations, of Washington, D.C. Mr. Greep has spent much time in Venezuela working with the Agency for International Development on the savings and loan program.

According to the Caracas Daily Journal, the present homebuilding boom in Venezuela is due to the private home financing made available by the new savings and loan associations recently established in Latin America. In just a few short years, the introduction of savings and loan associations has had a major impact on Latin America. It is my hope that the Congress soon will take additional steps to accelerate this highly worthwhile program by enacting legislation to establish an International Home Loan Bank which would channel limited funds from savings associations in the United States in the form of "seed capital" investments in these newly organized, locally owned and managed savings institutions in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

The above-mentioned article follows:

SAVINGS AND LOANS

(By Alvaro Arria)

Venezuela's construction industry is riding in the crest of a homebuilding boom.

Industry leaders say it surpasses even the gold dust days of the mid-1950's, when Venezuela leapt from its colonial structure to the futuristic skyline it has today. In the first 10 months of last year, investments in private construction totaled 530 million bolivars—the highest amount in any year except 1959—and experts were predicting an alltime record would be reached by December.

This year, the boom has, if anything, gained greater momentum, spilling from Caracas' narrow valleys to fill whole new areas with houses, buildings, and schools. A leading firm in the horizontal property field recently estimated 4,000 new apartments would go up by 1966.

THE ROLE OF SAVINGS AND LOAN

Builders say a major factor in producing this boom is the rapid growth of the savings and loans system. Thousands of Venezuelans who see in it an opportunity to build their own homes, have made the system the fastest growing financing plan in the country. According to builders, this is because it places a private home within the reach of many who could not afford it otherwise. And this, say the builders, is the reason homebuilding prospects are so encouraging.

While new in Venezuela, the savings and loans system's ancestry goes back to the industrial revolution days of England's 18th century. English immigrants brought the system to the United States in 1831, where it grew rapidly. By the turn of the century, the system's total assets in the United States reached \$579 million. Thirty-one years later, this figure had grown to \$6,400 million.

Today the savings and loan system in the United States consists of 6,000 private associations with capital assets above \$100,000 million. Eloquent testimony of its importance to the American construction industry is the fact one of two homes built in the United States are financed through a savings and loans association.

ADOPTION IN 1961

Venezuela adopted the system in 1961 through two presidential decrees. These decrees created the central savings and loans office and the savings and loans commission—the agencies which regulate the functioning of the system in Venezuela.

The Savings and Loans Commission is in charge of establishing the norms of operation for savings and loans companies in Venezuela, as well as of approving creation of these companies. It is the highest authority on savings and loans in the country, and through its decisions the system is developed and expanded. It is made up of seven principal and seven alternate members, chosen by the President from leading figures in the construction industry and government.

The central savings and loans office is the technical and administrative body of the system. Its job is to carry out the decisions taken by the commission, to create new savings and loans companies, and to intervene in them whenever necessary. The central office also handles the legal work for the system.

ADD LOANS

Savings and loans began in Venezuela with a Bs. 45 million fund provided by the Agency for International Development (ADD) and Bs. 33 millions loaned by the Venezuelan Government. This capital was later expanded by another government loan of Bs. 35 millions to a total of Bs. 113 millions. In October 1962, the system consisted of only a few companies with total savings of Bs. 1.64 million, and that year loans approved by the system amounted to only Bs. 134,000.

Today, 21 savings and loans companies with nearly Bs. 80 millions operate in the country. As of March this year loans approved by these companies totaled Bs. 167 millions, and experts say real growth is just beginning.

GOVERNMENT BILL

In view of this extraordinary growth, the Government has started work on a law to "institutionalize" the savings and loans system. The bill—now being studied in Congress—aims to replace the central office and commission and the norms of operations with a solid legal structure.

The bill was introduced by Miraflores' planning and coordinating office (Cordiplan) with the plan of making a national autonomous institute of the savings and loans system. Its principle objective is to create national savings and loans bank to handle the work presently being done by the two government agencies.

But the bill has met with criticism from business circles, which claims nationalizing the system would greatly hinder its development. Construction industry leaders argue that national institutes are inefficient and inoperative. They point to the success savings and loans have had under private control and say it would never have been possible if the system were in government hands.

The construction chamber and the Venezuelan Federation of Savings & Loans Associations have both announced their stand publicly on several occasions.

FEDECAMARAS STAND

Recently the Chambers Federation (Fede- camaras), Venezuela's most important business organization added its weight to this stand.

Fedecamaras President Concepcion Quijada said making the savings and loans system a national institute would deter savings since "people have built up confidence in private savings and loans bank, but only if this bank was a private corporation."

Quijada said capital for the bank should be mixed private-government, and not 100 percent government as planned in the bill. He also said the bank's board of directors should have at least two representatives of private savings and loans associations, and one representative of the construction industry.

According to the Government bill, all seven members of the board of directors will be appointed by the President of the Republics and of these, none may be a director of a savings and loans association.

COPEI PROPOSAL

While debate of these differences was still going on, a second savings and loans bill was introduced by the Social Christian Party (COPEI).

The COPEI bill follows closely the stand adopted by business leaders, inasmuch as it plans the savings and loans bank as a private corporation, but allows some representation of private savings and loans associations, and accord that capital for the bank will be 25 percent private.

Until now, neither Fedecamaras nor the construction chamber has announced that they will support COPEI's bill. While the bill meets nearly all the requirements these bodies have asked for, COPEI's congressional strength gives little hope that the bill might be passed over the three *Amplia* base parties, who support the Cordiplan bill.

Some observers have said private enterprise would rather seek a compromise with the *Amplia* base parties than support a bill introduced by the opposition.

What Fedecamaras and private business will decide is not easy to predict. But it is clear that this decision will vitally affect the future development of the savings and loans system and the construction industry, and through them, the nation's economy.

For this reason, the business world's attention is focused on the deliberations and negotiations Fedecamaras is holding on this matter, and also on the possible willingness of the Government to compromise with private enterprise in a joint effort to economically develop Venezuela.

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. CLEVENGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. PEPPER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

A BILL TO PROVIDE INSURANCE PROTECTION FOR ACTIVE DUTY SERVICEMEN

(Mr. EVERETT (at the request of Mr. CLEVENGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Speaker, the Insurance Subcommittee of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs has been working for several weeks on legislation which would provide insurance coverage for members of the Armed Forces who are on active duty.

Survivors of members of the Armed Forces who lose their lives on active duty are protected by the dependency and indemnity compensation program for service-connected death. This program became effective in 1957 and is designed to give continuing protection to the wife, children, and dependent parents of servicemen who lose their lives from service-connected causes.

The dependency and indemnity compensation program does not extend to single men whose parents are nondependent. It is the purpose of the bill which I am introducing to make available insurance coverage to single men with nondependent parents. This coverage would also be available to servicemen with wives, children, and dependent parents in addition to the protection which they now receive under the de-

pendency and indemnity compensation program.

The bill which I am introducing is the result of conferences with officials of the Veterans' Administration and Defense Department, Veterans' Administration insurance experts and insurance experts from the private companies. This bill is patterned closely after the group insurance program now available to Federal employees. It would provide for a program of group life insurance which would be administered by the Veterans' Administration and underwritten by private insurance companies. The plan would be voluntary; however, members of the Armed Forces would be required to sign a statement in writing removing themselves from the program if they do not desire to participate. Members of the Armed Forces being separated would be given a period of 31 days after separation during which insurance could be converted and continued with one of the participating companies. The premiums would be established by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs based on actuarial estimates. However, tentative estimates supplied the Insurance Subcommittee indicate that this insurance would be available at a rate of about 25 to 35 cents per thousand per month.

The U.S. Government would bear the extrahazardous cost of war deaths under this program just as it did in the U.S. Government life insurance and national service life insurance programs.

The Insurance Subcommittee has scheduled hearings on this legislation for September 8, 1965, with the hope that a satisfactory program can be developed and passed before the end of this session.

CONGRESSMAN STRATTON ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF 1965 CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE IN 35TH DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

(Mr. STRATTON (at the request of Mr. CLEVINGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker I am happy to bring to the attention of my colleagues the results of my 1965 congressional questionnaire. I should point out that this upstate New York district has a party enrollment which favors the Republican Party by a margin of nearly 2½ to 1 although President Johnson carried the district last year by more than 50,000 votes. It will be apparent from the figures below, the people I have the honor to represent, on the basis of their replies to this questionnaire, still strongly support the President, his handling of our foreign policy and in general his domestic legislative program. I believe these results will be of great interest to Members of the House. I might also add, Mr. Speaker, that basically this is the same congressional district which was represented prior to 1962 for a period of 40 years by our distinguished former colleague from Auburn, Hon. John Taber.

The question and answer results follow:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Do you favor:

1. Our actions and policies in Vietnam and Dominican Republic? Yes, 61 percent; no, 25 percent; undecided, 14 percent.

2. The two-price or class I base for dairy farmers, to allow them to cooperate voluntarily to bring milk supply into line with demand? Yes, 44 percent; no, 11 percent; undecided, 45 percent.

3. Extension of the Area Redevelopment Administration, to help communities with high unemployment to attract new business? Yes, 65 percent; no, 20 percent; undecided, 15 percent.

4. Continuation of the present wheat certificate plan for wheat farmers? Yes, 14 percent; no, 39 percent; undecided, 47 percent.

5. Federal help to local communities in constructing needed sewer lines or water systems? Yes, 67 percent; no, 24 percent; undecided, 9 percent.

6. President Johnson's proposal to combat crime by putting limitations on the importation and mail order shipment of firearms? Yes, 65 percent; no, 30 percent; undecided, 5 percent.

7. Adoption of a constitutional amendment allowing States with a two-house legislature to apportion one house on the basis of factors other than population, as is done with the U.S. Senate? Yes, 56 percent; no, 19 percent; undecided, 25 percent.

8. Spending some \$30 million to construct two flood control dams at Davenport Center in Delaware County and on the Genegantslet Creek in Chenango County without waiting for the results of a comprehensive survey of up-to-date flood needs in the Susquehanna River basin? Yes, 11 percent; no, 75 percent; undecided, 14 percent.

9. The administration's voting rights bill, to enforce the 18th amendment in places like Selma, Ala., and elsewhere? Yes, 64 percent; no, 19 percent; undecided, 17 percent.

10. Federal funds for college scholarships for needy and deserving students? Yes, 72 percent; no, 21 percent; undecided, 7 percent.

11. Federal help in developing and distributing scarce water supplies to combat New York State's continuing drought? Yes, 67 percent; no, 22 percent; undecided 11 percent.

12. Amending our present immigration laws to base immigration quotas on education, skill, and family relationship rather than national origins? Yes, 67 percent; no, 17 percent; undecided, 16 percent.

13. Generally speaking, do you approve of President Johnson's handling of his job since taking office? Yes, 64 percent; no, 18 percent; undecided, 18 percent.

FOREIGN SHIPPERS REFUSE SAIGON-BOUND U.S. GOODS

(Mr. ROGERS of Florida (at the request of Mr. CLEVINGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the Greek crew of the freighter *Stamatis S. Embiricos* has refused a \$10,000 bonus in addition to wages to sail 10,000 tons of U.S. Army supplies from Long Beach, Calif., to South Vietnam.

The Army cargo was previously offered to a Mexican-flag ship, which also refused to transport the urgently needed war materiel.

The cargo is now scheduled to be shipped sometime around September 8 aboard the American-flag freighter *Bay State*.

Why should the Greek crew balk at doing this job for the United States? Greek-flag ships have received a total of \$360,000 from the United States for hauling U.S. cargoes to South Vietnam since the beginning of January of this year.

Furthermore, in case there is any doubt as to the willingness of Greek ships to call in the Vietnam area, 15 Greek vessels have hauled goods into North Vietnam since the beginning of this year.

Mr. Speaker, this incident illustrates the vital need for a strong American merchant shipping industry. The U.S. Government must not depend on the whims and temperament of foreign shipping interests. We need our own ships to handle defense needs in time of national emergency.

If the American shipping industry declines any more, and it now handles less than 10 percent of the total traffic of goods flowing through U.S. ports, this Nation may one day find itself landlocked when it needs to sealift goods to a war zone.

I urge that the U.S. Government be first to "ship American."

OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CANADA

(Mr. DINGELL (at the request of Mr. CLEVINGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, in recent years the traditional tranquillity of our relationships with Canada has been seriously disturbed by Canadian concern over her heavy deficit with the United States in automotive trade. Some methods employed by Canada to reduce her automotive trade imbalance have threatened to trigger a retaliatory sequence that could have grown into a mutually disastrous trade war between the world's greatest commercial partners.

Thanks to imaginative leadership on both sides of the border, such folly has not been permitted to occur. Instead, calm and reasonable negotiations have resulted in the Automotive Products Trade Agreement we are considering here.

I support, without reservation, the bill before us which would implement the agreement and provide for effective assistance to those firms and workers who may find it necessary to make adjustments.

While some of the initial adjustments may be difficult, the longer range consequences of this trade agreement are stronger automotive industries, greater automotive employment, and more value for car customers in both countries.

Considering the tremendous impact the automotive industry has on the economy of our Nation—about one-sixth of the U.S. gross national product is derived from spending on automotive transportation—the direct benefits of expanding the total North American auto-

September 1, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

21733

LONG and myself, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the General Bridge Act of 1946.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial on this subject, published in the St. Louis Post Dispatch of August 17, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the editorial will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 2483) to amend the General Bridge Act of 1946 for the purpose of maintaining existing bridge clearances on navigable rivers and waterways connecting with the sea, introduced by Mr. SYMINGTON (for himself and Mr. LONG of Missouri), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Public Works.

The editorial presented by Mr. SYMINGTON is as follows:

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Aug. 17, 1965]

BRIDGES, NOT BARRIERS

The war over bridge clearances on the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers has been going on for more than 8 years now and still it is being fought to a conclusion on a span-by-span basis. Currently under debate are one structure at Omaha which is being built and another at Kansas City for which a permit has been issued. Both would still further reduce the minimum clearances of 52 feet vertical and 400 feet horizontal in existence on bridges now in use.

As the Waterways Journal of St. Louis declared editorially, this procedure "not only is a needless expense for waterway interests, but there is always the danger that some proposals will not be discovered until it is too late." The result could be to foreclose the waterways to some types of important freight as has already been done on the highways and the railroads by inadequate clearances. Minimum clearances on these two principal rivers should not be further reduced unless for more compelling reasons than have yet been raised. The country must not sell its future short on the last transportation artery capable of carrying giant freight.

TO EXPAND THE JURISDICTION OF THE FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION TO INCLUDE THE CLAIMS OF U.S. CITIZENS AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in 1954 Congress established the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate claims by U.S. citizens against foreign countries which have seized their property.

During the past 15 years, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and its predecessors have made awards to claimants from funds available as part of settlements with the United States by Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

In other cases, where no settlement on claims has been reached between the United States and the expropriating nation, Congress has empowered the Commission to determine the validity and amount of U.S. citizens' claims against the expropriating country anyway, but payment of the claims has been made only from assets of the foreign government in the possession of the United States.

Where there have been no such assets, no payment has been made at all.

In this latter class of cases, in which no assets exist from which payment can be made, the Commission nonetheless determines the merits and the amounts of the claims in order to decide and record the facts of each case and in order to provide the Secretary of State with an intelligent basis upon which to negotiate with the expropriating power, should it be determined prudent to do so.

Last year Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to include determination of the amount and the validity of claims by U.S. citizens against the Government of Cuba which have arisen as a result of the Castro Government's bad credit, expropriation, and lawlessness against U.S. citizens.

That legislation specifically provided that it could not be construed as authorizing an appropriation for the purpose of paying these Cuban claims.

I think the Cuban Claims Act was a wise piece of legislation.

But I think the jurisdiction of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission should also be extended to include claims of U.S. citizens against the Chinese Communist Government for expropriation, unpaid debts, and other unlawful injuries. Therefore, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to authorize the Foreign Claims Commission to hear, decide, and record these claims against the day when Communist China can be brought to the bar of international law and justice.

The bill I propose in no way changes the provisions of the Cuban Claims Act passed last year, except to allow the Commission to adjudicate claims of U.S. citizens against Communist China on the same basis as claims against Cuba.

This bill, like the Cuban Claims Act, will not involve or authorize any appropriation of funds to pay these claims.

But it will provide some remedy for those of our citizens who have been victimized by the outlawry of Communist China.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2484) to amend title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 to provide for the determination of the amounts of claims of nationals of the United States against the Chinese Communist regime, introduced by Mr. Dodd, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

SANCTIONS AGAINST SHIPPING COMPANIES TRADING WITH NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill designed to discourage and bring sanctions against shipping companies throughout the free world which persist in trading with North Vietnam.

It is high time, Mr. President, that such companies realize the full extent and implications of the situation in which we are engaged in Vietnam.

The United States of America—this Nation's soldiers, sailors, and airmen—are fighting and dying in Vietnam to protect the free world from further Communist encroachment upon freedom and liberty.

Yet a number of ships of free world nations continue to carry supplies to North Vietnam. It may well be that supplies carried to North Vietnam by free world vessels are predominantly nonstrategic in nature. It may be that any loss of supplies from free world ships to North Vietnam could be replaced by Communist bloc vessels.

But I maintain, Mr. President, that any supplies of any kind to a nation making war on its neighbor contribute directly to the war effort and could result in the death of American and allied fighting men. I contend further, Mr. President, that the burden of furnishing such supplies to an aggressor nation should fall upon those in sympathy with the aggressor. No freedom-loving nation should seek to profit from trade which could result in the death of boys seeking to defend freedom.

In the 18-month period between January 1964 through June 1965 ships from the free world have carried 476 cargoes to North Vietnam. In the first half of this year, ships from six free world nations have visited North Vietnamese ports a total of 75 times. The six nations represented in this trade are the United Kingdom—which accounted for about 60 percent of this traffic—Japan, Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, and Lebanon.

Ironically, 24 of the very same vessels which have hauled cargoes to North Vietnam have put in to American ports no fewer than 75 times in the 18 months between January 1964 through June 1965.

It seems inconceivable to me that the United States should open its ports to vessels which may have earlier carried cargoes to North Vietnam or may be heading to North Vietnamese ports soon after putting in at American harbors.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that this Nation should not only prohibit those individual ships from utilizing American ports, but should similarly penalize any vessel owned by a private shipping interest which permits any ship under its control to carry cargoes to or from North Vietnam.

The bill I am introducing today would do just that. From the time it becomes law, the proposal would prohibit the use of American ports to the ships of any private interest which allowed any of its vessels to traffic with the North Vietnamese.

This, it seems to me, is the very least this Nation could do to punish those who continue to seek profits at the possible cost of spilling American blood on Vietnamese soil.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2485) to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, to prohibit transportation of articles to or from the United States aboard certain foreign vessels, and for other purposes, introduced

by Mr. BAYH, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

**HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965
AMENDMENTS**
AMENDMENT NO. 429

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I submit an amendment to section VII of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (H.R. 9567), which is scheduled to be considered by the Senate tomorrow.

The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965—Public Law 89-117—established an interest rate ceiling on college housing of 3 percent. My amendment applies the same formula to loans made under title III of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963—Public Law 88-204. The amendment is effective after enactment of the Higher Education Act. Presently loans are charged an interest rate of 3% percent; \$120 million was appropriated for these loans for the current fiscal year.

My amendment therefore would equalize the interest rate charged for construction of classrooms and other college facilities with that now charged for dormitory rooms and college housing. The Office of Education informs me that it has no objection to the amendment.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment will be received, printed, and will lie on the table.

AMENDMENT NO. 430

Mr. MILLER submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 9567, the Higher Education Act of 1965, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

**ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS
AND RESOLUTION**

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, at their next printing, I ask unanimous consent that the names of the following Senators be added as cosponsors of the following bills and resolution:

S. 1883, Mr. FANNIN.

S. 2430, Mr. FONG and Mr. INOUYE.

S. 2435, Mr. TYDINGS.

Senate Resolution 121, Mr. HARTKE and Mr. MILLER.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the next printing of S. 2478, a bill to give consent to three additional States to enter into a compact for bus taxation proration and reciprocity, the name of the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] be added as a sponsor.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**CHANGE IN HEARING DATE ON
CRITICAL WATER PROBLEM**

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, previously I had announced that the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs would hold a hearing on September 9 on the critical water problem in the Northeast.

The date has been changed to September 8 due to an unavoidable conflict in committee activity.

The hearing will be held in room 3110 of the New Senate Office Building, and it is our purpose to hear Secretary of the Interior Udall, serving in his capacity as Chairman of the Water Resources Council, who will inform the committee on the current scope of Federal activity in assisting the States which have suffered due to the drought in the Northeast.

**NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON SENATE
BILL 2049**

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, I wish to announce that hearings will be held by the subcommittee on S. 2049, a measure to realine the counties comprising the territory of the U.S. district courts for the eastern and western districts of Oklahoma.

The hearings are scheduled for September 9 at 10 a.m. in room 6226 of the New Senate Office Building. Any person who wishes to testify or submit statements pertaining to this measure should contact the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. COTTON:

Editorial entitled "Twenty Years of Ecumenicism," dealing with the Cathedral of the Pines at Rindge, N.H., which has observed its 20th anniversary.

THE SALE OF WHEAT AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, today the United States has a vast surplus stock of wheat.

Today the United States continues to lose its already heavily diminished stock of gold.

In that this Nation now has less than \$24 billion of gold, and owes abroad, primarily to foreign central banks, over \$28 billion of current liabilities redeemable in gold, the problem is obvious.

One way to help solve the said problem would be to follow the precedent set by many other countries of the free world—Argentina, Australia, Canada, France—and sell wheat for gold to customers behind the Iron Curtain.

In that connection, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Russian Deals Brighten U.S. Wheat Outlook," published in the Kansas City Times of August 17, 1965.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RUSSIAN DEALS BRIGHTEN U.S. WHEAT OUTLOOK

The wheat market outlook in the United States was made suddenly brighter by Cana-

dian and Argentine sales to the Soviet Union. This is true even though the United States was not included in the deals. This country now stands as the only potential exporter of wheat with a large surplus for sale.

We have no way of know whether Russia or the satellites will want more wheat and might be forced to come to the United States for it. But if such should be the case, this country should be in a position to sell if it is considered expedient at the time. This would require the elimination of the provision that half of any wheat sold to the Soviet bloc must be carried in U.S. vessels which charge freight rates higher than foreign vessels. This single factor would cut the United States out of the Russian cash market. It does nothing whatever to prevent the Soviets from buying wheat elsewhere.

But whether a single bushel is sold to the Soviet bloc, the United States has a greater opportunity than before to supply markets any place else in the world.

It is axiomatic that any industry that has an ample supply of its product on hand, immediately available to be delivered to a customer at a competitive price, is in a position to do business. That is the U.S. position today. At this particular time we have an advantage over other exporting countries in the world.

Canada has a lot of wheat, or will have after this summer's harvest. But it apparently has sold or has commitments to sell all that it can deliver before next May. Australia has ceased exporting wheat until it determines what the winter harvest will be. Currently, that country's wheat prospects are not too promising. Argentina has apparently sold to its limits its winter harvest. The United States has harvested a big crop to add to a substantial carryover.

Even before the big Russian purchases, the dollar export market for U.S. wheat has been good this summer, but additional sales have been made to Western Europe and Japan in the last few days. Wheat exports are larger thus for this marketing year than the grain trade had expected and are larger than at this time last year. If demand from abroad continues strong, U.S. sales should continue to grow.

In 1963 the maritime unions and some ship owners were successful in getting the administration to invoke the rule requiring the use of American ships to haul grain to Russia. Only by extra subsidy gimmicks was it possible then for this country to make two important sales. We submit, however, that if a principle is involved in selling to Russia, the principle is not altered by charging higher freight rates. Actually, the effect is to leave the Russian market open to all other countries and the American vessels haul no wheat.

Looking to the rest of the world, U.S. dollar sales are handled by the private grain trade. These are firms in the business of trading to make money. The more they can sell, the greater the profits. We have no suggestion for a better system of stimulating trade. In fact, in support of the free enterprise system we might refer to the fact that Russia with its controlled economy must buy wheat—it was once an exporter. The United States still is an exporter and by exporting it not only strengthens its own economy but further relieves the balance-of-payments problem which has by no means been solved.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that an editorial entitled "Wheat Exports Lost," published in the Des Moines Register of August 25, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

September 1, 1965

VIETNAM: NARROWING THE ISSUES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the fighting in Vietnam is unabated. Military engagements intensify. Casualties on all sides increase. The streams of refugees rise. The extent of the devastation wrought is not known but it is obviously immense. Indeed, the costs of the heightened conflict in Vietnam already dwarf the billion-dollar development program for the Mekong project in southeast Asia which was suggested by President Johnson in a speech in April at Johns Hopkins University.

The President did not want it that way. At Johns Hopkins, he stated emphatically his preference for peace. He has since emphasized it at every opportunity. He offered then, and he has offered again and again, to enter into "unconditional discussions," in an effort to bring the war to an end. These appeals for negotiation, unfortunately, have either been ignored, dismissed with derision, or otherwise rejected. The efforts of various intermediary nations to initiate negotiations—efforts which have been endorsed by the United States—have met a similar fate. These attempts, in short, have all drawn a blank.

It might be concluded, therefore, that Hanoi and the Vietcong have no interest whatsoever in negotiating peace. As if to reinforce this conclusion, Ho Chi Minh has talked in terms of a 20-year war. It would appear, then, that Hanoi is determined to continue the military struggle until the United States is driven into the sea. But the President has made clear that we will not permit that to happen and it will not happen.

There the matter stands. Hanoi and the Southern Liberation Front insist that they will not desist from the struggle and we will not yield. Is there, then, no alternative but a trial by arms in the 3-, 5-, or 10-year conflict which is projected by some of our own officials or the 20-year war which was mentioned by Ho Chi Minh?

Hanoi has indeed talked of a 20-year war. But from that same city there has also come talk of the conditions on which the war might end. Hanoi stated these conditions for peace in a radio broadcast on April 12, 1965, in response to the President's Johns Hopkins speech. The conditions were underscored subsequently by Peiping and by Moscow. From these announcements, it would appear that negotiations to end the conflict are feasible, insofar as Hanoi is concerned, on the basis of these four conditions.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these conditions be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the conditions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1. That the rights of the Vietnamese people—peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity—on the basis of the Geneva agreements are recognized;

2. That the division of Vietnam into two zones will continue, pending peaceful reunification and that there will be no foreign military alliances, bases, or troop personnel in connection with either zone;

3. That the internal affairs of South Vietnam will be determined by the South Viet-

namese people themselves alone in accordance with the National Liberation Front program and without any foreign interference;

4. That the peaceful reunification of Vietnam will be settled eventually by the Vietnamese people themselves in both zones and without foreign interference.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I cite these conditions which have been set forth by Hanoi because it is important that we do not assume that we are engaged in Vietnam against a group or a government which has no objective except warfare for the sake of warfare. On the contrary, it would appear that the leaders in Hanoi and the Southern Liberation Front and their allies in Peiping and their supporters in Moscow have a very clear idea of why they fight and, in the four points to which I have referred, of the conditions on which they will cease fighting.

In a similar fashion, while some U.S. officials have suggested, as noted, that we are engaged in a 3-, 5-, or 10-year war, the President has also spoken of peace and the great desirability of restoring it as quickly as possible in Vietnam. There are conditions on which we, too, would be prepared to see this conflict terminated, although there may still be confusion both at home and abroad as to what these conditions may be.

To be sure, there have been pronouncements from various sources and in general terms, about ending aggression from the north. There has been talk of aiding the South Vietnamese Government as long as our aid is sought. There have been individual views of why we fight expressed in the press, in Congress and in the departments of the Government. But with all due respect there could be set forth, cohesively, even now, the basic conditions which U.S. policy regards as essential to peace in Vietnam. Such conditions do exist. They can be distilled from President Johnson's many statements on Vietnam and other official pronouncements. And it may be useful at this time to set them forth, once again, in cohesive form. A clarification on this point may not only be helpful to public understanding; it may also be a spur to the initiation of negotiations.

In any event, the Communists have not alone set forth the conditions for peace in Vietnam. We have also done so even though they may not be fully understood. Given the degree of American involvement and sacrifice, we, too, have the right and responsibility to define again and again as concisely and as clearly as possible, the basic conditions for peace in that nation, as we see them.

Indeed, it may be—and certainly, it is to be hoped—that the clear juxtaposition of the two sets of conditions for peace may lead to the "unconditional discussions" which are properly and urgently sought as a means of bringing this bitter and brutal struggle to an end.

When the official statements of the policy of the United States of the past few months are examined, it would appear to me that these conditions for peace in Vietnam have already been identified by the President and his prin-

ciple spokesmen during the past few months:

First. There must be a verified choice by the people of South Vietnam of their own government—a choice free of terrorism, violence, and coercion from any quarter. In this connection, the President clearly stated at Johns Hopkins:

We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

Second. There can be a future for South Vietnam either in independence or as a part of a unified Vietnam on the basis of a peaceful, free, and verified expression of the wish of the people in each segment of that region and in general accord with the Geneva agreements. In a press conference on July 28, the President gave emphasis to this point when he said:

We insist and we will always insist that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South, or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision.

Third. There shall be a withdrawal of all foreign forces and bases throughout Vietnam, north and south, provided peace can be reestablished and provided the arrangements for peace include adequate international guarantees of non-interference, not only for Vietnam, but for Laos and for Cambodia as well. This point was underscored by Secretary McNamara on June 16 when he said:

The United States has no designs whatsoever on the territory or the resources of southeast Asia or any country in it. Our national interests do not require that we introduce military bases for our forces in southeast Asia. They don't require that the states of southeast Asia become members of Western military alliances. The ultimate goal of our country, therefore, in southeast Asia is to help maintain free and independent nations there in which the people can develop politically, economically, and socially, according to patterns of their own choosing, and with the objective of becoming responsible members of the world family of nations.

Further, we are parties to the Geneva accord of 1962 which is designed to achieve essentially these ends in Laos and we have expressed our willingness to join in a resumption of a Geneva conference for the purpose of considering international guarantees of the independence, integrity, and borders of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

To these three basic conditions of peace, I would add two corollaries which all of us must realize are obviously essential if peace in Vietnam is to be reached via the operations of negotiation rather than through the exhaustion of war.

I can say, on the basis of my conferences with the President on this matter, that the following two points have always reflected his viewpoint, and do so now:

First. There needs to be provision for a secure amnesty for those involved in the struggle on all sides in Vietnam as an essential block to an extension of the barbarism and atrocities of the struggle into the subsequent peace and, indeed, as an essential of that peace.

Second. There needs to be a willingness to accept, on all sides, a cease-fire and standfast throughout all Vietnam, which might well coincide with the initiation of negotiations.

President Johnson has made it clear, time and again, that we seek no larger war. He has made it clear, time and again, that we do not have any territorial, or military, or other claim whatsoever in Vietnam. He has said, time and again, that our only purpose is to help the South Vietnamese people to secure their own future, free from coercion. He has said, time and again, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions with anyone, anywhere, to bring about peace. From that policy, as it has been enunciated and as it is quoted, it would seem to me entirely valid to distill American conditions for peace along the lines which have been enumerated.

To be sure, others may brush aside these conditions, even as we tend to do the same with respect to the conditions which they have set forth. Hanoi may reach, via an automatic reflex, the conclusion that these conditions, since they originate in the United States, can only mean domination of South Vietnam by ourselves and those whom we support. And, in all frankness, we are prone to a converse conclusion, via the same reflex, with respect to the conditions which are suggested from Hanoi. The reflex of mistrust and disbelief is understandable. But unless the military conflict is to expand and to continue into the indefinite future, whether it be 3, 5, 10, or 20 years of war, the degree of accuracy of these automatic reflexes must be tested in negotiations.

The high purpose of negotiations, if they can be initiated, should be to see to it that the conditions of peace wherever they may originate come to mean in fact and in detail the domination of the Vietnamese people themselves over their future. Beyond other considerations, this conflict involves primarily their country, their lives, their children. It is the Vietnamese people, north and south, who suffer most from its devastating and tragic consequences. And in the end it is they who should have the right to determine the shape of the Nation in which they live. That is where negotiations can lead. That is where the President wants them to lead. That is where they must lead, if there is ever to be a valid peace in Vietnam.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Senator has just made an historic and most vital pronouncement.

I wish that every one of the Senators entitled to sit in the Chamber had been here to hear it. We should constantly reiterate, in terms that cannot conceivably be misunderstood anywhere on earth, not only our willingness to negotiate, but also our willingness to negotiate on fair conditions and the fact that we are not opinionated.

The best thing that the Senator said, and I know that he speaks most authoritatively, is that we will look with an unprejudiced eye on suggestions and ideas,

no matter where they come from, once we are at the table of peace—which is the negotiating table.

I welcome the statement of the Senator warmly. I think it should mean a great deal to the millions of people in our country who thoroughly back what is being done in that part of the world, but who, at the same time, are unhappy about the fact that we have to do it with the resulting casualties in a time of relative peace in the world. This situation is a tragic thing in the hearts of all Americans.

I am grateful to the majority leader. I hope that he will speak out again and again and make it crystal clear, in the highest forum of the land, in the hope that America will remain not only strong and unhampered by anything that has occurred, but that we will also intelligently and reasonably work toward and implement a solution of the problem in the way in which the majority leader has just suggested.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the senior Senator from New York.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I congratulate the majority leader on his speech, which so clearly defines the issues that exist between us and the Communists in southeast Asia.

I find myself nearly always in agreement with the views, wisdom, and estimates of the future expressed by our majority leader.

I call the attention of the Senate to the service which the Senator from Montana rendered in delivering his speech sometime back when the talk of negotiation was not quite as much in vogue as it is now, and in which he suggested that we ought to give thought to reconvening of the Geneva Conference under the leadership of the cochairmen, the British and the Soviets.

I believe that the speech which the Senator made then has had a real impact in determining our course. One may use the phrase that it was an effort to descale the conflict.

In this connection, I am among those who completely support President Johnson in the thrust of his present foreign policy in the Far East and, specifically, in South Vietnam. However, I am also among those who would oppose unilateral escalation into the north, and indeed have some concern and doubt as to the effect of our course there. In general, I find that President Johnson's policies reflect completely, to my mind, the requirements of the situation and the objectives of our foreign policy, which are peace and freedom. I find myself in full, 100-percent support of those objectives.

We must realize, in the sense of history, that the Chinese and Vietnamese under Communist leadership have used time as the fourth dimension in the practice of warfare. They used it very successfully in their struggle against the French in Vietnam in the past. It is only when we accept the reality of time as the fourth dimension of warfare and are willing to face the prospects of a long war and a long holding position that we

find the ground suddenly becomes more fertile to talk of negotiations. Until we reach that stage of willingness to accept time as the fourth dimension in warfare, our efforts to reach the conference table may lack success as seen from the framework of history.

Our majority leader has knowledge of the Far East and a sense of history there, both beyond parallel in the Senate today.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I express my deepest thanks to the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, with whom I had an opportunity to visit South Vietnam and other areas of southeast Asia a few years ago, as a result of which visit, we were able, along with the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Boggs], to issue a report which I think would stand up even today.

May I say, speaking for the President, that no one is more interested concerning what is happening in Vietnam than is the man in the White House.

I do have conferences with him one way or the other almost every day. This is the main topic of conversation. I know how he feels about it. I know of the many avenues that he has traveled in his attempts to seek a way out of the impasse in which we find ourselves.

Not only does it take up every waking moment of his time, but a good bit of his sleeping time as well. I think we are extremely fortunate to have in the White House a man who has this forward view, a man who is interested in trying to bring about a just settlement, a man who has the welfare of the people at heart, a man who has this responsibility to shoulder and who is doing the best he can, with all the wisdom he has, to bring about a just and lasting conclusion to the struggle in which we are engaged.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to add to the splendid colloquy which has just taken place with respect to Vietnam that I share that solicitude and concern, and I share what the Senator from Rhode Island has had to say about escalation and the concern of the American people with respect to that. I have urged speaking to the people through Congress by means of a resolution similar to the resolution adopted in August of last year, which is now obsolete. These are manifestations of a dynamic freedom and do not represent one with a lessening of American determination to proceed solidly.

It is very important that people in Asia, and everywhere in the world, should not misunderstand our country because of its many representations that it desires peace. The determination of this country stands unimpaired because of our soul searching to find a means for peace, in which the President has been leading us. It should be understood that nothing will stop us in our efforts to arrive at a fair and just conclusion, but that it is conditioned by the President's determination. I hope very much that these efforts are not misunderstood as indicating an irresolution on our part. It would be most unfortunate if those who do not understand us made that implication.

So I welcome this historic statement by the Senator from Montana [Mr.

September 1, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

21741

MANSFIELD]. It seems to me that what the Senator has said should be said often. Our willingness to negotiate should be known and we should welcome efforts and suggestions, no matter where they come from, as to how this grave struggle may be brought to an end.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BACKING AMERICA'S STAND IN VIETNAM

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, the national commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Mr. John A. Jenkins, is a distinguished attorney in Birmingham, Ala. He is also a close friend of many Members of this Senate, including myself.

During his year as commander in chief of the VFW, "Buck" Jenkins has worked tirelessly in the interests of our Nation's security. One of the reasons his opinions are so eagerly sought on defense matters is that he has personally visited many of the trouble spots of the world.

"Buck" Jenkins was recently in South Vietnam, where he visited our troops in the forested highlands, the base at Da Nang, and the beachhead at Chu Lai.

Commander Jenkins reported to his fellow citizens in Birmingham a few days ago when he addressed the Birmingham Rotary Club.

Because he is so knowledgeable in the matter, his observations as to why our policy in Vietnam is correct are particularly noteworthy. His address before the Birmingham Rotary Club was the subject of a fine editorial in the Birmingham News on July 26, 1965.

In view of the importance of what VFW Commander in Chief Jenkins said, I ask unanimous consent to have the editorial printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Birmingham (Ala.) News]

BATTLE'S FOUGHT AT HOME, TOO

The importance of firm backing by the American people of this country's stand in Vietnam has been stated many times by many people. Few have stated it more eloquently than John A. "Buck" Jenkins of Birmingham, who is the national commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Addressing the Birmingham Rotary Club last week, Jenkins did not indulge in empty oratory for oratory's sake. He spoke directly to the point: As leaders of the free world, Americans cannot turn their backs on "the problems and worries of the world," can't "abrogate and forget these obligations and responsibilities."

The fact is that if the United States of America is not willing and able to stand in defense of freedom—however onerous the burden seems—then the precarious thread by which freedom hangs may be strained to the breaking point by those who seek to replace human liberty with state tyranny.

The U.S. Government recognizes this obligation and in Vietnam is acting upon it. For the United States to back out now, Jenkins said, would be like "a general walking off and leaving his troops in the field." For America to stay and do what is necessary is impossible without the full backing, in full understanding of what is involved, of the American people.

The organization Jenkins heads is composed of men who have a most direct stake

in freedom's preservation: Those who have gone abroad to fight this country's battles in its behalf.

There is a war being fought in Vietnam by soldiers who are asked to bleed and die if necessary. The war also must be fought on the homefront through commitment of the American people and readiness on their part to make the kind of sacrifices which Buck Jenkins reminded Rotarians are a concomitant to preservation of freedom. The sacrifices we at home might be asked to make are small in comparison with those asked of our men in freedom's frontlines, but they are not insignificant. They are just as important to ultimate victory.

REPORT ON THE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE XXXII VENICE BIENNALE 1964

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Venice Biennale has for 60 years been an important international exhibition of modern art. The 32d Venice Biennale of 1964 was particularly significant. For, in the past, American artists had been only sparsely represented, but at this exhibition, the U.S. Government, acting through the U.S. Information Agency, sponsored and greatly enlarged the American selection. Permission was enthusiastically granted by the directors of the festival to have created an annex devoted exclusively to the works of American artists. This had never before been done; yet, the American collection was widely felt to be the highlight of the entire show. Perhaps the most significant occurrence was the awarding of the International Grand Prize in painting to an American, Robert Rauschenberg; no American had ever been so honored.

I have received a report from Alan F. Solomon, the U.S. Commissioner to the 32d Venice Biennale. Mr. Solomon chose the American selection and also directed its presentation. His report presents his views as U.S. Commissioner as to the significance of the festival as well as its implications for the future.

I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REPORT ON THE AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE 32D VENICE BIENNALE 1964

It was without a doubt a happy historical accident that the American Government, through the USIA, took over the official sponsorship of the American representation for the Venice Biennale at precisely the moment when Europe was ready to turn with enthusiasm and sympathy to American art, and to accept it as a major international cultural force.

In the 60-year history of the Biennale no American painter had ever won the first International Prize; through most of this period art had been dominated by the School of Paris, and its ascendancy was habitually acknowledged in Venice and elsewhere.

When I was given the chance to select this exhibition I accepted with great excitement because of the opportunity it clearly provided for introducing on a broad scale to an already anticipatory European audience the vitality and creative energy marking the American generation which has grown up since the Second World War.

Those of us who were familiar with the history of modern art and involved in contemporary developments already knew that the School of Paris had declined since 1945, after 150 years of predominance in world art, and we knew that the only new progressive impulse had come out of Americans, commencing at about the same time. For the first time in history, we had not one, but two consecutive generations of artists who were genuine innovators, and did not derive indirectly from European precedents.

Even in more recent years, when American art has been less provincial, our representation in Venice was limited by the small size of the American Pavilion, originally built under private auspices, and more recently the property of the Museum of Modern Art in New York.

In the light of the possibilities of an imposing American representation at the Biennale, I went to Venice in November 1963, with Lois Bingham of USIA and Michael Barjansky of USIS Rome. From the first, we were greeted with a spirit of great enthusiasm and cooperation by the officials of the Biennale, both because of the new fact of U.S. Government participation, and because of the prospect of an exciting and pathfinding American exhibition. (It should be pointed out that the recent decline of European art had been reflected in the Venice Biennale, which was losing its traditional reputation as a rallying point for modern art, and about which there had already been predictions of decline and actual demise. This also accounted to a certain degree for the official enthusiasm toward us.)

We asked the biennale for additional space for our exhibition, but there was none available on the grounds. They accepted in principle the idea of a precedent setting annex outside the grounds to make a larger American exhibition possible, and showed us a number of potential sites, including abandoned churches, the prison of the Doges, and the gambling casino, which is empty during the summer. For various reasons, none of these was appropriate, and we finally arranged to use the empty American Consulate.

The preview week made the effect of the American exhibition and its success abundantly clear. We gave two preview parties, partly under the auspices of the sponsoring Jewish Museum, the first for the press and the artists, and the second, under the auspices of the Ambassador and Mrs. Reinhardt, for local officials and other guests. In everyone's account, these occasions were the high point of the week, in terms of public enthusiasm and response.

Meanwhile the jury (two Italians, an American for the first time, a Brazilian, a Pole, a Swiss, and a Dutch representative) met, and as we were subsequently informed, from the first felt the clear superiority of the American contingent. They voted to give the International Grand Prize in painting to an American, Robert Rauschenberg.

The effect of the prize was extraordinary, not only because it had gone to an American for the first time, but also because it had gone to an artist in his late thirties, and not, as it usually did, to a much older man. Furthermore, Rauschenberg was in midcareer, and the prize implied an acknowledgement of youth and not achievement in the past, as it had previously. Young artists were profoundly moved by this acknowledgement of youth and fresh new directions. To others, the prize (this one and the others granted were, it seemed to me, closer to the consensus of the international art audience gathered in Venice at the time than any previous awards within recent memory) seemed to mark the revitalization of the Venice Biennale, and the restoration of its prestige as an accurate mirror of present conditions.

There were, of course, others who were displeased with the result. These included the critics from the popular press, and the members of the art community more committed to the old than to the new. Another intense reaction came from the French critics; it was triggered by a public statement I made to the effect that "it is acknowledged on every hand that New York has replaced Paris as the world art capital." Although this is a generally understood fact, the remark upset the French in the context of the critical and official indifference to their own pavilion. After the biennale, the Paris press was full of indignation, hysteria, and later, soul searching about the situation in French art. To me the high point of this hysteria was the allegation in the newspaper Arts that the Americans and the Communists had conspired together against the French. Quite without our intending it, the American exhibition had the effect of making dramatically apparent the end (temporarily at least) of 150 years of French dominance of art.

In the Italian and other European press there was an extraordinary response to the American show, and it received about 90 percent of the biennale press coverage (the biennale officials good naturally objected about this to me). There were extensive color spreads in five or six major magazines, and hundreds of columns of text and pictures in the papers.

For the most part, the exhibition, while it generated all this excitement, was misunderstood by the press, which described the biennale as a takeover of Europe by American pop art, despite the fact that neither I nor any of the artists participating consider their work to be pop art (I had made a point of this in the selection of the exhibition). This kind of reaction is understandable and predictable, since new developments in art have experienced similar problems for the past 150 years, because it takes time for the public to understand the unfamiliar new objectives of artists.

Since our exhibition was arranged to show the major new indigenous tendencies, the peculiarly American spirit of the art is wholly unfamiliar to the European audience, and it therefore requires exposure to completely new experiences and modes of understanding, toward which I feel we took an important step on this occasion. The intense press response and the public reaction of bewilderment bring to mind what happened in America just 50 years ago, when we were shocked out of our provincial isolation by the 1913 armory show in New York, which opened our eyes to the 20th century art of Europe and Paris in particular. I do not feel that it would be immodest to assert that we have done for Europe in the 32d biennale what the armory show did for us.

On the other hand, the response of the informed public, the professional critics and artists was touching and impressive. Many of them sought us out during the preview week and later during the summer to express their astonishment at the vitality and authority of the young Americans. For example, Werner Haftmann, a distinguished German scholar, told me it was the most impressive biennale exhibition he had ever seen. Antonioni, the prizewinning Italian filmmaker, became so enthusiastic that he asked about working with several of our artists, and subsequently invited Oldenburg to design sets for a projected film.

Santomaso, one of the best known of the older Italian painters, who lives in Venice, spent the summer proselytizing among visitors for the new American art, which he feels shows Europe the way out of its present cultural dilemma. Music, a mature painter from Yugoslavia, who was regarded as one of the most important world artists in the fifties, told me that his whole vision as an artist had been altered in 30 seconds when

he first saw our exhibition. He had wintered in Paris for 15 years, but his life there no longer interested him; this year he is coming to New York.

The individuals I have mentioned all have some direct experience of the United States, which partly explains their rapport with our art. On the other hand, both in Venice and elsewhere in Europe where I visited during the summer, Paris, London, Holland, I was always approached by young artists who awesomely asked personal questions about our artists, and then intensely pursued their major preoccupation: How to get to New York.

A number of individuals in government played important parts in the project. One employee of USIS in Rome, an Italian named Giordano Falzoni, made invaluable contributions to our success, as sympathetic liaison with the Italians, and as someone with understanding and experience of the American situation. I would like to point out that the energy and resourcefulness of USIS London, which had nothing to do with the exhibition, was most impressive; Francis Mason took advantage of the presence of the exhibition in Europe to arrange an important show in London for one of the artists, Jasper Johns.

One other individual requires special mention, Geoffrey Groff-Smith, of USIS Trieste, who was enormously helpful with local arrangements in Venice. Intelligent, dedicated to his job, efficient and reliable, he is a man whose value to us in Italy cannot be overestimated.

Apart from these Government people, I am deeply obliged to the staff of The Jewish Museum, New York, and to Mrs. Alice M. Denney, of Washington, D.C., for her important contributions as assistant director of the American exhibition.

If Government support of the biennale continues, and I earnestly believe it should, since there is no more effective and dramatic way of communicating to the Europeans the level of our artistic activity, the problem of an adequate pavilion must be confronted. I believe it would be a serious error to become involved in an annex again in Venice, as the details of our experience make quite clear.

We need a new pavilion, not simply because it would be desirable to have more space, but also in the interest of our national image, and our concern for cultural matters, since many smaller countries have far more imposing structures. Beyond this, the present space simply cannot serve to do the job properly, considering the trouble and expense involved.

On my own initiative I began exploring the problem of a new pavilion a year ago. I would be happy to communicate the information I have gathered, about local site problems, local regulations, building conditions, etc., to anyone interested in pursuing it. I would like to point out that Philip Johnson, one of America's most celebrated architects, and an ardent advocate of the new American art, has expressed to me his willingness to volunteer his services for the design of a new pavilion under appropriate circumstances.

By the measure of direct political expediency or the measure of popular antagonism toward new developments in the arts, it would be easy to discount the importance and the impact of the American exhibition in the 32d Venice Biennale, apart from the important evidence of the Rauschenberg prize and the other less tangible effects I have attempted to define. However, I feel that the exhibition was one of the most important enterprises undertaken on the cultural level by our Government in Europe since the war.

I would like to say most emphatically that I attribute this success not to my own involvement, but to the courage and foresight of Robert Sivard and Lois Bingham of the Exhibits Division of USIA. Setting aside

their own personal prejudices, and fully aware of the risks they might run, they understood, with a great deal of comprehension of the present cultural situation, the importance of taking a bold and decisive position. By giving me complete esthetic freedom in the exhibition, they have made possible an affirmation of America's new leadership in world art, the positive ramifications of which will be felt for a long time to come.

ALAN R. SOLOMON,
U.S. Commissioner.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, as in executive session, I report, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, the nomination of Lawrence Francis O'Brien to be Postmaster General.

I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JORDAN of Idaho in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider executive business.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, by unanimous vote of those present and those voting by proxy, this morning voted to recommend the immediate confirmation of the nomination of Lawrence F. O'Brien, of Massachusetts, to be Postmaster General.

Mr. O'Brien is well known to many Members of the Senate. His nomination was approved without any opposition. No witness testified in opposition to it. The committee was unanimous in its decision that the confirmation of the nomination should go forward forthwith.

Mr. O'Brien's dedication and public service and knowledge of public affairs are known to many of us.

POSTMASTER GENERAL

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The nomination will be stated by the clerk.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Lawrence Francis O'Brien, of Massachusetts, to be Postmaster General.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the nomination?

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—as has been stated by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Mr. O'Brien appeared before the committee, and after hearing and interrogation by members of the committee, his nomination was unanimously approved.

As ranking minority member of the committee, I am not only pleased by the nomination, but I am most pleased that the President submitted his nomination.

I have one more thing to mention. I hope the nomination of Mr. Gronouski will be before the Senate for confirmation, in order that the nomination may be cleared without too much of a lapse between the time he was named and action on his nomination.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to join the chairman of the committee and the ranking minority member of the committee. There is not much I can add, except to say that in my